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While many analyses of monetary policy consider only the adjustment of a central
bank’s target for a short-term nominal interest rate, other dimensions of policy have
recently been of greater importance: changes in the supply of bank reserves beyond
those required to achieve an interest-rate target, changes in the assets acquired by
central banks, and changes in the interest rate paid on reserves. We extend a standard
New Keynesian model to allow a role for the central bank’s balance sheet in equilibrium
determination, and consider the connections between these alternative dimensions of
policy and traditional interest-rate policy. We distinguish between “quantitative eas-
ing” in the strict sense and targeted asset purchases by a central bank, and argue
that while the former is likely be ineffective at all times, the latter dimension of policy
can be effective when financial markets are sufficiently disrupted. Neither is a per-
fect substitute for conventional interest-rate policy, but purchases of illiquid assets are
particularly likely to improve welfare when the zero lower bound on the policy rate is
reached. We also consider optimal policy with regard to the payment of interest on
reserves, and argue that the interest rate on reserves should be kept near the central
bank’s target for the policy rate at all times.
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The recent global financial crisis has confronted central banks with a number of questions
beyond the scope of standard accounts of the theory of monetary policy. Monetary policy
is ordinarily considered solely in terms of the choice of an operating target for a short-term
nominal interest rate, such as the federal funds rate in the case of the Federal Reserve. Yet
during the recent crisis, other dimensions of policy have occupied much of the attention of
central bankers. One is the question of the appropriate size of the central bank’s balance
sheet. In fact, the Fed’s balance sheet has grown dramatically in size since the fall of 2008
(Figures 1 and 2).
As shown in Figure 1, the component of the Fed’s liabilities constituted by reserves held
by depository institutions has changed in an especially remarkable way: by the fall of 2008
reserves were more than 100 times larger than they had been only a few months earlier.
This explosive growth has led some commentators to suggest that the main instrument of
US monetary policy has changed, from an interest-rate policy to one often described as
“quantitative easing.” Does it make sense to regard the supply of bank reserves (or perhaps
the monetary base) as an alternative or superior operating target for monetary policy? Does
this (as some would argue) become the only important monetary policy decision once the
overnight rate (the federal funds rate) has reached the zero lower bound, as it effectively has
in the US since December 2008? And now that the Federal Reserve has legal authorization
to pay interest on reserves (under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008), how
should this additional potential dimension of policy be used?
The past two years have also seen dramatic developments with regard to the composition
of the asset side of the Fed’s balance sheet (Figure 2). Whereas the Fed had largely held
Treasury securities on its balance sheet prior to the fall of 2007, other kinds of assets — a
variety of new “liquidity facilities”, new programs under which the Fed essentially became
a direct lender to certain sectors of the economy, and finally targeted purchases of certain
kinds of assets, including more than a trillion dollars’ worth of mortgage-backed securities —
have rapidly grown in importance, and decisions about the management of these programs
have occupied much of the attention of policymakers during the recent period. How should
one think about the aims of these programs, and the relation of this new component of
Fed policy to traditional interest-rate policy? Is Federal Reserve credit policy a substitute
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for interest-rate policy, or should it be directed to different goals than those toward which
interest-rate policy is directed?
These are clearly questions that a theory of monetary policy adequate to our present cir-
cumstances must address. Yet not only have they been the focus of relatively little attention
until recently, but the very models commonly used to evaluate the effects of alternative pre-
scriptions for monetary policy have little to say about them. Many models used for monetary
policy analysis — both theoretical models used in normative discussions of ideal monetary
policy commitments, and quantitative models used for numerical simulation of alternative
policies — abstract altogether from the central bank’s balance sheet, simply treating a short-
term nominal interest rate as if it were under the direct control of the monetary authorities,
and analyzing how that interest rate should be adjusted.1 But such a framework rules out
the kinds of questions that have recently preoccupied central bankers from the start.
In this paper, we extend a basic New Keynesian model of the monetary transmission
mechanism to explicitly include the central bank’s balance sheet as part of the model. In
addition to making more explicit the ways in which a central bank is able to (indirectly) exert
control over the policy rate, the extended model allows us to address questions about other
dimensions of policy of the sort just posed. In order to make these questions non-trivial, we
also introduce non-trivial heterogeneity in spending opportunities, rather than adopting the
familiar device of the “representative household,” so that financial intermediation matters
for the allocation of resources; we introduce imperfections in private financial intermediation,
and the possibility of disruptions to the efficiency of intermediation, for reasons taken here as
exogenous, so that we can examine how such disturbances affect the desirability of central-
bank credit policy; and we allow central-bank liabilities to supply transactions services, so
that they are not assumed to be perfect substitutes for privately-issued financial instruments
of similar maturity and with similar state-contingent payoffs. Finally, we consider the con-
duct of policy both when the zero lower bound on the policy rate is not a binding constraint,
and also when it is.
In section 1, we begin with a general discussion of whether (and when) one should expect
aspects of the central bank’s balance sheet to matter for equilibrium determination. This
1This approach is developed in detail in Woodford (2003).
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is intended both to motivate our modeling exercise, by explaining what features a model
must have in order for policies affecting the balance sheet to be of possible significance, and
to introduce some important distinctions among alternative dimensions of policy. Section
2 outlines the structure of our model, with primary attention to the way that we model
financial intermediation and the policy choices available to the central bank. Section 3 then
uses the model to discuss changes in the supply of bank reserves as a dimension of policy, and
the related question of the rate of interest that should be paid on reserves. Section 4 turns
to the question of the optimal composition of the central bank’s asset portfolio, considering
the conditions under which the traditional “Treasuries only” policy would be optimal in the
context of our model. Section 5 then considers the optimal size and duration of central-bank
credit policy in those cases where “Treasuries only” is not the optimal policy, and section 6
concludes.
1 When Does the Central-Bank Balance Sheet
Matter?
It might be thought that monetary policy analysis would have to be involve explicit consid-
eration of the central bank’s balance sheet, at least to the extent that one believes in the
importance of general-equilibrium analysis. Yet monetary DSGE models often abstract from
any discussion of the central bank’s balance sheet. In fact, this is not only possible (in the
sense that the models have at least a logically consistent structure), but is quite innocuous,
under a certain idealized view of the functioning of financial markets. Neither the size nor
the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet matter for equilibrium prices or quan-
tities except because of financial imperfections. This is important, both to understand why
additional dimensions of policy may suddenly become relevant when the smooth functioning
of financial markets can no longer be taken for granted, and to understand why we emphasize
certain types of frictions in our analysis below. The introduction of credit frictions requires a
significant complication of our analysis, and before undertaking this modeling effort, it may
be useful to clarify why our assumptions about credit frictions are essential to the conclusions
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that we obtain.
1.1 An Irrelevance Result
It is often supposed that open-market purchases of securities by the central bank must
inevitably affect the market prices of those securities (and hence other prices and quantities
as well), through what is called a “portfolio-balance effect”: if the central bank holds less
of certain assets and more of others, then the private sector is forced (as a requirement for
equilibrium) to hold more of the former and less of the latter, and a change in the relative
prices of the assets will almost always be required to induce the private parties to change the
portfolios that they prefer. In order for such an effect to exist, it is thought to suffice that
private parties not be perfectly indifferent between the two types of assets; and there are all
sorts of reasons why differences in the risky payoffs associated with different assets should
make them not perfect substitutes, even in a world with frictionless financial markets.2
But this doctrine is inconsistent with the general-equilibrium theory of asset prices, at
least to the extent that financial markets are modeled as frictionless. It is clearly inconsistent
with a representative-household asset pricing theory (even though the argument sketched
above makes no obvious reference to any heterogeneity on the part of private investors). In
the representative-household theory, the market price of any asset should be determined by
the present value of the random returns to which it is a claim, where the present value is
calculated using an asset pricing kernel (stochastic discount factor) derived from the repre-
sentative household’s marginal utility of income in different future states of the world. Insofar
as a mere re-shuﬄing of assets between the central bank and the private sector should not
change the real quantity of resources available for consumption in each state of the world, the
representative household’s marginal utility of income in different states of the world should
not change. Hence the pricing kernel should not change, and the market price of one unit of
a given asset should not change, either, assuming that the risky returns to which the asset
represents a claim have not changed.
The flaw in the “portfolio-balance” theory is the following. It assumes that if the private
2Explanations by central banks of what they believe is accomplished by targeted asset purchases frequently
invoke this mechanism.
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sector is forced to hold a portfolio that includes more exposure to a particular risk — say,
a low return in the event of a real-estate crash — then private investors’ willingness to hold
that particular risk will be reduced: investors will anticipate a higher marginal utility of
income in the state in which the real-estate crash occurs, and so will pay less than before for
securities that have especially low returns in that state. But the fact that the central bank
takes the real-estate risk onto its own balance sheet, and allows the representative household
to hold only securities that pay as much in the event of a crash as in other states, does
not make the risk disappear from the economy. The central bank’s earnings on its portfolio
will be lower in the crash state as a result of the asset exchange, and this will mean lower
earnings distributed to the Treasury, which will in turn mean that higher taxes will have to
be collected by the government from the private sector in that state; so the representative
household’s after-tax income will be just as dependent on the real-estate risk as before. This
is why the asset pricing kernel does not change, and why asset prices are unaffected by the
open-market operation.3
The irrelevance result is easiest to derive in the context of a representative-household
model, but in fact it does not depend on the existence of a representative household, nor
upon the existence of a complete set of financial markets. All that one needs for the argument
are the assumptions that (i) the assets in question are valued only for their pecuniary returns
— they may not be perfect substitutes from the standpoint of investors, owing to different
risk characteristics, but not for any other reason — and that (ii) all investors can purchase
arbitrary quantities of the same assets at the same (market) prices. Under these assumptions,
the irrelevance of central-bank open-market operations is essentially a Modigliani-Miller
result, as noted by Wallace (1981). If the central bank buys more of asset x by selling shares
of asset y, private investors should wish purchase more of asset y and divest themselves of
asset x, by exactly the amounts that undo the effects of the central bank’s trades. The
reason that they optimally choose to do this is in order to hedge the additional tax/transfer
income risk that they take on as a result of the change in the central bank’s portfolio. If
share θh of the returns on the central bank’s portfolio are distributed to household h, where
3Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show in the context of a representative-household model that it does
not matter which assets a central bank purchases in its open-market operations, on precisely this ground.
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the {θh} are a set of weights that sum to 1, then household h should choose a trade that
cancels exactly fraction θh of the central bank’s trade, in order to afford exactly the same
state-contingent consumption stream as before. Summing over all households, the private
sector chooses trades that in aggregate precisely cancel the central bank’s trade. The result
obtains even if different households have very different attitudes toward risk, different time
profiles of income, different types of non-tradeable income risk that they need to hedge, and
so on, and regardless of how large or small the set of marketed securities may be. One can
easily introduce heterogeneity of the kind that is often invoked as an explanation of time-
varying risk premia without this implying that any “portfolio-balance” effects of central-bank
transactions should exist.
AsWallace (1981) notes, this implies that both the size and the composition of the central-
bank balance sheet should be irrelevant for market equilibrium in a world with frictionless
financial markets (more precisely, a world in which the two postulates hold). This does not,
however, mean, as is sometimes thought, that monetary policy is irrelevant in such a world; it
simply means that monetary policy cannot be implemented through open-market operations.
Control of a short-term nominal interest rate by the central bank remains possible in the
frictionless environment. The central bank is still free to determine the nominal interest rate
on overnight balances at the central bank as an additional dimension of policy (alongside its
decisions about the quantity of liabilities to issue and the particular types of assets that it
buys with them).4 This interest rate must then be linked in equilibrium to other short-term
interest rates, through arbitrage relations; and hence the central bank can determine the level
of short-term nominal interest rates in general. Moreover, the central bank’s adjustment of
nominal interest rates matters for the economy. Even in an endowment economy with flexible
prices for all goods, the central bank’s interest-rate policy can determine the evolution of the
general level of prices in the economy; in a production economy with sticky prices and/or
wages, it can have important real effects as well.5
4The existence of these three independent dimensions of central-bank policy is discussed further below in
section 2.3, in the context of an explicit model.
5Both the way in which the central bank can determine the level of short-term interest rates in a frictionless
economy, and the macroeconomic implications of interest-rate policy in such models, are treated in detail in
Woodford (2003, chaps. 2, 4).
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In analyzing monetary policy options for a world of this kind, there would be no need to
include the central bank’s balance sheet in one’s model at all: it would suffice that the short-
term nominal interest rate be one of the asset prices in the model, and that it be treated
as under the control of a monetary authority. This provides a potential justification for the
use of “cashless” models in monetary policy analysis, in which no balance-sheet quantities
at all appear.6 At the same time, the assumptions required for the irrelevance result are still
fairly strong (even if not so special as discussions of “portfolio-balance” effects often seem
to assume), and it worth considering the consequences of relaxing them.
1.2 Allowing a Transactions Role for Central-Bank Liabilities
Many readers of Wallace (1981) are likely to have found the result paradoxical, and doubted
the practical relevance of the entire line of reasoning, for one reason in particular. Wallace’s
result implied, not only that exchanges of Treasuries for mortgage-backed securities by the
Federal Reserve, holding fixed the overall size of the Fed’s balance sheet, should have no
effect, but also that increases in the supply of bank reserves as a result of open-market
purchases of Treasuries should have no effect. Yet the latter kind of operation had long been
routinely used by the Fed to bring about desired changes in the federal funds rate, as every
undergraduate learns. The theory seemed patently inapplicable to the operations of actual
central banks in actual market economies.
But one can easily account for the overwhelming evidence of the FRBNY Trading Desk’s
influence upon the federal funds rate by modifying the model in one small respect. It is
clear that overnight balances at the Fed have often been held despite being dominated in
rate of return; until October 2008, these balances earned a zero nominal return, while other
6Of course, no one has proposed that any actual economies literally satisfy the two postulates; in partic-
ular, some central-bank liabilities are clearly valued in ways that are inconsistent with the two postulates.
The use of “cashless” models for practical monetary policy analysis accordingly requires a further argument,
which is that the transactions frictions that account for the observed demand for base money are not likely
to make a large quantitative difference for the structural relations that matter for the analysis of alternative
interest-rate policies, even if they matter a great deal for the precise way in which a central bank is able
to implement interest-rate policy. See, e.g., McCallum (2000, 2001), Woodford (2003, chap. 2, sec. 3, and
chap. 4, sec. 3), and Ireland (2004).
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overnight interest rates (such as the federal funds rate) were invariably higher, for reasons
that cannot be attributed purely to default risk. A natural (and thoroughly conventional)
inference is that this particular asset is (or at least, has often been) held for reasons beyond
its pecuniary return alone; we may suppose that reserves at the Fed (and base money more
generally) supply transactions services, by relaxing constraints that would otherwise restrict
the transactions in which the holders of the asset can engage. The existence of these non-
pecuniary returns — which may be modeled using any of a variety of familiar devices — will
invalidate the Wallace (1981) neutrality result, at least insofar as open-market purchases of
securities that increase the supply of reserves are concerned.
We can introduce a transactions role for reserves, or for liabilities of the central bank
more generally, however, while still entertaining the hypothesis that with regard to all assets
other than monetary liabilities of the central bank, the two postulates still hold: assets other
than “money” are valued only for their pecuniary returns, and all investors can purchase
arbitrary quantities of any of these assets at the same (market) prices. In this case, a
weaker irrelevance result for central-bank trades still applies. No open-market operation that
changes the composition of the central bank’s asset portfolio, while keeping unchanged the
outstanding volume of the monetary liabilities of the central bank, should have any effects on
asset prices, goods prices, or the allocation of resources.7 Again, the argument is essentially
a Modigliani-Miller theorem, and holds despite an arbitrary degree of heterogeneity in the
situations of different households, and regardless of the size of the set of traded securities.
The result in this case validates the classic monetarist position: the supply of monetary
liabilities by the central bank matters for macroeconomic equilibrium, but it does not matter
at all what kinds of assets might “back” those liabilities on the other side of the central bank’s
balance sheet, or how the base money gets to be in circulation. Hence a generation or two
of texts in monetary economics have found it convenient to analyze monetary policy using
models in which there is no central-bank balance sheet — merely a government printing
press which creates additional “money” at a greater or lesser rate, which is then put in the
hands of private parties, perhaps by dropping it from helicopters. Again, the omission is
7This is the result obtained by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), in the context of a representative-
household model with transactions services represented by money in the utility function.
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completely justifiable, if financial markets function efficiently enough for the two postulates
to hold, except for the qualification regarding the special properties of “money.”
Under this view, there would be still be no ground for viewing targeted asset purchases
as a relevant dimension of central-bank policy, though variations in the supply of monetary
central-bank liabilities would matter. It might seem, then, Bernanke’s (2009) assertion that
the Federal Reserve’s expansion of its balance sheet in the fall of 2008 represented “credit
easing” rather than “quantitative easing” had matters backward: that the only real effect
that should have been expected would have resulted from the expansion in the supply of
bank reserves, regardless of the nature of the lending financed by that expansion in reserves.
Yet this is not the conclusion that we draw at all. Expansion of the supply of bank
reserves stimulates aggregate demand under normal circumstances, because it has ordinarily
been the means by which the Fed has lowered the federal funds rate; yet once the supply of
reserves is sufficient to drive the funds rate essentially to zero (as has been the case since late
in 2008), there is no reason to expect further increases in the supply of reserves to increase
aggregate demand any further, as we explain in the context of an explicit model in section 3.
Once banks are no longer foregoing any otherwise available pecuniary return in order to hold
reserves, there is no reason to believe that reserves continue to supply any liquidity services
at the margin; and if they do not, the Modigliani-Miller reasoning applies once again to open
market operations that increase the supply of reserves, just as in the model of Wallace.
While this reasoning cannot correctly be applied to conclude that open-market securities
purchases that increase the supply of reserves can never have any effect, it can quite plausibly
be used to conclude that such purchases should have no effect once the opportunity cost of
reserves has fallen to zero. (It is fairly obvious that an open-market purchase of riskless
short-term Treasury securities by issuing similarly riskless nominal short-term liabilities of
the Fed should have no effect, once there is no longer any shortage of cash. But if pure
changes in the central bank’s asset portfolio have no effect, then an increase in reserves to
purchase short-term Treasuries should have the same effect as an increase in reserves to
purchase some other asset, which effect must then be zero.) Hence it is not plausible that
“quantitative easing” can be an effective strategy for providing further monetary stimulus
once the zero lower bound is reached.
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1.3 Do Targeted Asset Purchases Ever Matter?
We would argue, then, that Bernanke (2009) was right not to propose to stimulate the
economy through “quantitative easing.” But is there any more reason to expect “credit
easing” to be of avail? Under the two postulates mentioned above, the answer is no. Yet
there is some evidence suggesting that at least some of the Fed’s special credit facilities, and
similar programs of other central banks, have affected asset prices8
As a simple example, Figure 3 shows the behavior of the spreads between yields on
various categories of commercial paper and the one-month overnight interest-rate swap rate
(essentially, a market forecast of the average federal funds rate over that horizon), over the
period just before and after the introduction of the Fed’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility
at the beginning of October 2008. (The darkest solid line shows the quantity of purchases of
commercial paper by the Fed, which spikes up sharply at the introduction of the new facility.)
The reason for the introduction of the new facility had been a significant disruption of the
commercial paper market, indicated by the explosion of spreads in September 2008 for all
four of the types of commercial paper shown in the figure. The figure also shows that spreads
came back down again immediately with the introduction of the new facility, for three of the
classes of paper (all except the A2/P2 paper) — these three series being precisely the ones
for commercial paper of types that qualified for purchases under the CPFF. The spread for
the A2/P2 paper instead remained high for several more months, though this spread as well
has returned to more normal levels eventually, with the general improvement of financial
conditions.9
Not only the sudden reduction in spreads for the other three types of paper, but the
fact that spreads did not decline in the case of paper not eligible for purchase by the new
facility, suggests that targeted asset purchases by the Fed did change the market prices of
the assets in question. Hence some further modification of the two postulates is required in
8See, e.g., Ashcraft et al. (2010), Baba et al. (2006), Gagnon et al. (2010), Sarkar (2009) and Sarkar and
Shrader (2010). For skeptical readings of the evidence, see instead Taylor (2009) and Stroebel and Taylor
(2009).
9For further discussion of the crisis in the commercial paper market, this Fed program, and its effects,
see Adrian et al. (2010) and Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010).
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order to allow a realistic analysis of the effects of programs of this kind. We propose that
it is the assumption that all investors have equal opportunities to invest in all assets on the
same terms that must be modified. If only certain specialists have the expertise required
to invest in commercial paper, then developments that adversely affect the capital of those
specialists (or their ability to fund themselves) can result in an increase in commercial paper
yields relative to those on other instruments of similar maturity, as occurred in the fall of
2008. And central-bank purchases of commercial paper will not be offset by a corresponding
reduction in private-sector purchases of that specific asset — even if the implications of
the policy for state-contingent tax liabilities are correctly understood by everyone — if the
parties whose state-contingent tax liabilities change are largely investors who cannot invest in
commercial paper in any event, and so cannot hold less of it even if the central bank’s action
causes them to bear more income risk that is correlated with commercial-paper returns.
Hence in developing a model to assess the conditions under which “unconventional”
dimensions of monetary policy may be relevant, it is important that we not assume that all
financial-market participants can costlessly trade the same set of financial instruments. (A
fortiori, it is important that we not adopt the simplification of assuming a representative
agent.) In the next section, we sketch a relatively simple model that possesses the minimal
elements required for a non-trivial discussion of the issues raised in the introduction.10
We assume heterogeneity in the spending opportunities available to different households
at any point in time, so that some will have a motive to borrow while others are willing to
save; and we assume that the households without current urgent needs for funds lack the
expertise required to directly extend credit themselves to the borrowing households, so that
they must instead deposit funds with competitive intermediaries who are in turn able to
offer loan contracts to the borrowing households. We also allow the central bank a choice
between holding “liquid” assets (Treasury debt) that can also be held by saving households
on the same terms, and “illiquid” assets (the debt of private borrowers) that can otherwise
only be held by the specialist intermediaries. Finally, we allow the central bank to create
liabilities (reserves) that supply liquidity services, and so may be held in equilibrium even
10Other recent examples of DSGE models that can be used to address some of these same issues include
Gertler and Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), and Del Negro et al. (2010).
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when they earn a lower interest rate than that on Treasury debt.
We model these various frictions in relatively reduced-form ways; our interest here is
not in illuminating the sources of the frictions, but in exploring their general-equilibrium
consequences. In particular, we wish to understand the extent to which they give rise to a
multiplicity of independent dimensions for central-bank policy, and the interrelations that
exist between variations of policy along these separate dimensions.
2 A Model with Multiple Dimensions of Monetary
Policy
Here we sketch the key elements of our model, which extends the model introduced in Cu´rdia
and Woodford (2009a) to introduce the additional dimensions of policy associated with the
central bank’s balance sheet. (The reader is referred to our earlier paper, and especially its
technical appendix, for more details.)
2.1 Heterogeneity and the Allocative Consequences of Credit Spreads
Our model is a relatively simple generalization of the basic New Keynesian model used for
the analysis of optimal monetary policy in sources such as Goodfriend and King (1997),
Woodford (2003), and Gali (2008). The model is still highly stylized in many respects;
for example, we abstract from the distinction between the household and firm sectors of
the economy, and instead treat all private expenditure as the expenditure of infinite-lived
household-firms, and we similarly abstract from the consequences of investment spending for
the evolution of the economy’s productive capacity, instead treating all private expenditure
as if it were non-durable consumer expenditure (yielding immediate utility, at a diminishing
marginal rate).
We depart from the assumption of a representative household in the standard model, by
supposing that households differ in their preferences. Each household i seeks to maximize a
12






uτ t(i) (ct(i); ξt)−
∫ 1
0
vτ t(i) (ht (j; i) ; ξt) dj
]
, (2.1)
where τ t (i) ∈ {b, s} indicates the household’s “type” in period t. Here ub(c; ξ) and us(c; ξ)
are two different period utility functions, each of which may also be shifted by the vector of
aggregate taste shocks ξt, and v
b(h; ξ) and vs(h; ξ) are correspondingly two different functions
indicating the period disutility from working. As in the basic NK model, there is assumed
to be a continuum of differentiated goods, each produced by a monopolistically competitive
supplier; ct(i) is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggegator of the household’s purchases of these differentiated
goods. The household similarly supplies a continuum of different types of specialized labor,
indexed by j, that are hired by firms in different sectors of the economy; the additively
separable disutility of work vτ (h; ξ) is the same for each type of labor, though it depends on
the household’s type and the common taste shock.
Each agent’s type τ t(i) evolves as an independent two-state Markov chain. Specifically,
we assume that each period, with probability 1 − δ (for some 0 ≤ δ < 1) an event occurs
which results in a new type for the household being drawn; otherwise it remains the same
as in the previous period. When a new type is drawn, it is b with probability pib and s with
probability pis, where 0 < pib, pis < 1, pib+ pis = 1. (Hence the population fractions of the two
types are constant at all times, and equal to piτ for each type τ .) We assume moreover that
ubc(c; ξ) > u
s
c(c; ξ)
for all levels of expenditure c in the range that occur in equilibrium. Hence a change in a
household’s type changes its relative impatience to consume, given the aggregate state ξt; in
addition, the current impatience to consume of all households is changed by the aggregate
disturbance ξt. We also assume that the marginal utility of additional expenditure diminishes
at different rates for the two types, as is also illustrated in the figure; type b households (who
are borrowers in equilibrium) have a marginal utility that varies less with the current level of
expenditure, resulting in a greater degree of intertemporal substitution of their expenditures
in response to interest-rate changes. Finally, the two types are also assumed to differ in
the marginal disutility of working a given number of hours; this difference is calibrated so
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that the two types choose to work the same number of hours in steady state, despite their
differing marginal utilities of income. For simplicity, the elasticities of labor supply of the
two types are not assumed to differ.
The coexistence of the two types with differing impatience to consume creates a social
function for financial intermediation. In the present model, as in the basic New Keynesian
model, all output is consumed either by households or by the government; hence inter-
mediation serves an allocative function only to the extent that there are reasons for the
intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of households to differ in the absence of finan-
cial flows. The present model reduces to the standard representative-household model in the
case that one assumes that ub(c; ξ) = us(c; ξ) and vb(h; ξ) = vs(h; ξ).
We assume that most of the time, households are able to spend an amount different from
their current income only by depositing funds with or borrowing from financial intermedi-
aries, that the same nominal interest rate idt is available to all savers, and that a (possibly)
different nominal interest ibt is available to all borrowers,
11 independent of the quantities that
a given household chooses to save or to borrow. For simplicity, we also assume that only
one-period riskless nominal contracts with the intermediary are possible for either savers or
borrowers. The assumption that households cannot engage in financial contracting other
than through the intermediary sector represents one of the key financial frictions. We also
allow households to hold one-period riskless nominal government debt, but since government
debt and deposits with intermediaries are perfect substitutes as investments, they must pay
the same interest rate idt in equilibrium, and the decision problem of the households is the
same as if they have only a decision about how much to deposit with or borrow from the
intermediaries.
Aggregation is simplified by assuming that households are able to sign state-contingent
contracts with one another, through which they may insure one another against both aggre-
gate risk and the idiosyncratic risk associated with a household’s random draw of its type, but
that households are only intermittently able to receive transfers from the insurance agency;
between the infrequent occasions when a household has access to the insurance agency, it
11Here “savers” and “borrowers” identify households according to whether they choose to save or borrow,
and not by their “type”.
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can only save or borrow through the financial intermediary sector mentioned in the previous
paragraph. The assumption that households are eventually able to make transfers to one
another in accordance with an insurance contract signed earlier means that they continue
to have identical expectations regarding their marginal utilities of income far enough in the
future, regardless of their differing type histories.
It then turns out that in equilibrium, the marginal utility of a given household at any
point in time depends only on its type τ t(i) at that time; hence the entire distribution of
marginal utilities of income at any time can be summarized by two state variables, λbt and
λst , indicating the marginal utilities of each of the two types. The expenditure level of type
τ is similarly the same for all households of that type, and can be obtained by inverting the
marginal-utility functions to yield an expenditure demand function cτ (λ; ξt) for each type.





τ (λτt ; ξt) +Gt + Ξt, (2.2)
where Gt indicates the (exogenous) level of government purchases and Ξt indicates resources
consumed by intermediaries (the sum of two components, Xipt representing costs of the
private intermediaries and Ξcbt representing costs of central-bank activities, each discussed
further below). Thus the effects of financial conditions on aggregate demand can be sum-
marized by tracking the evolution of the two state variables λτt . The marginal-utility ratio
Ωt ≡ λbt/λst ≥ 1 provides an important measure of the inefficiency of the allocation of expen-
diture owing to imperfect financial intermediation, since in the case of frictionless financial
markets we would have Ωt = 1 at all times.
In the presence of heterogeneity, instead of a single Euler equation each period, relating
the path of the marginal utility of income of the representative household to “the” interest
rate, we instead have two Euler equations each period, one for each of the two types, and
each involving a different interest rate — ibt in the case of the Euler equation for type b (who
choose to borrow in equilibrium) and idt in the case of the Euler equation for type s (who










for each of the two types τ = b, s, where for either type τ , we use the notation −τ to denote
the opposite type, and Πt+1 ≡ Pt+1/Pt (where Pt is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index) is the gross
rate of inflation. These two equations determine the two marginal utilities of expenditure
— and hence aggregate demand, using (2.2) — as a function of the expected forward paths
of the two real interest rates (1 + iτt )/Πt+1 and the expected average marginal utility of
expenditure far in the future. This generalizes the relation between real interest rates and
aggregate demand in the basic New Keynesian model. Note that in the generalized model,
the paths of the two different real interest rates (those faced by borrowers and those faced
by savers) are both relevant for aggregate-demand determination; alternatively, the forward
path of the credit spread matters for aggregate demand determination, in addition to the
forward path of the general level of interest rates, as in the basic model. (See Cu´rdia and
Woodford, 2009a, for further discussion.)
Under an assumption of Calvo-style staggered price adjustment, we similarly obtain struc-
tural relations linking the dynamics of inflation and real activity that are direct generaliza-
tions of those implied by the basic New Keynesian model (as presented, for example, in
Benigno and Woodford, 2005). As in the representative-household model, inflation is deter-
mined by a relation of the form12
Πt = Π(Zt), (2.4)
where Zt is a vector of two forward-looking endogenous variables,
13 determined by a pair of
structural relations that can be written in recursive form as




t ; ξt) + Et[Φ(Zt+1)] (2.5)
where z(·) and Φ(·) are each vectors of two functions, and the vector of exogenous distur-
bances ξt now includes shocks to technology and tax rates, in addition to preference shocks.
(The relations (2.5) reduce to precisely the equations in Benigno and Woodford, 2005, in
the case that the two marginal utilities of income λτt are equated.) This set of structural
equations makes inflation a function of the expected future path of output, generalizing the
12The definition of the function Π(·), and similarly of the functions referred to in the remaining equations
of this section, are given in the Appendix.
13These are the variables denoted Kt and Ft in Benigno and Woodford (2005) and similarly in Cu´rdia and
Woodford (2009a).
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familiar “New Keynesian Phillips curve”; but in addition to the expected paths of aggregate
output and of various exogenous disturbances, the expected future path of the marginal-
utility gap {Ωt} also matters,14 and hence the expected future path of the credit spread
(which determines the marginal-utility ratio). Thus this part of the model is completely
standard, except that “cost-push” effects of credit spreads are taken into account. Cu´rdia
and Woodford (2009a) show that equations (2.4)–(2.5) can be log-linearized to yield a re-
lation identical to the standard “New Keynesian Phillips curve,” except with additional
additive terms for the effects of credit spreads.
Finally, our model of the effects of the two interest rates on the optimizing decisions of
households of the two types imply an equation for aggregate private borrowing. The effects
of interest rates both on expenditure and on labor supply (and hence on labor income) can
be summarized by the effects of the expected paths of interest rates on the two marginal
utilities of income. In the case of an isoelastic disutility of labor effort function, the degree of
asymmetry between the amount by which expenditure exceeds income for type b relative to
type s households can be written as a function B(λbt , λ
s
t , Yt,∆t; ξt), where ∆t is an index of
price dispersion and ξt includes disturbances to both technology and preferences. The index
of price dispersion is a positive quantity, equal to 1 if and only if all goods prices at that date
are identical, and higher than 1 when prices are unequal. Price dispersion matters because
total hours worked (and hence the wage income of both types), for any given quantity of
demand Yt for the composite good, is proportional to ∆t; greater price dispersion results in
a less efficient composition of output and hence an excess demand for inputs relative to the
quantity consumed of the composite good.
Real per capita private debt bt then evolves in accordance with a law of motion of the
form








bt−1 (1 + ωt−1) + pibb
g
t−1
] 1 + idt−1
Πt
, (2.6)
14Note that using (2.2) and the definition of Ωt, one observes that the values of Yt,Ωt and the exogenous
disturbances determine the values of λbt , λ
s
t at any point in time.
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where ωt is the short-term credit spread defined by





and bgt is real per capita government debt (one of the exogenous disturbance processes in our
model). The supply of government debt matters for the evolution of private debt because
it is another component (in addition to the deposits with intermediaries that finance their
lending) of the financial wealth of type s households; because in our model government debt
and deposits are substitutes from the standpoint of type s households (who hold positive
quantities of both in equilibrium), in equilibrium government debt must also earn the interest
rate idt .
15 Hence the interest rates idt and i
b
t (or alternatively, i
d
t and the spread ωt) are the
only ones that matter for the evolution of private debt. (Note that equation (2.6) does not
correspond to any equation of the basic New Keynesian model, as there can be no private
debt in a representative-household model.)
Finally, as in Benigno and Woodford (2005), the assumption of Calvo-style price adjust-
ment implies that the index of price dispersion evolves according to a law of motion of the
form
∆t = h(∆t−1,Πt), (2.8)
where for a given value of ∆t−1, h(∆t−1, ·) has an interior minimum at an inflation rate
that is near zero (Πt = 1) when initial price dispersion is negligible (∆t−1 near 1), and the
minimum value of the function is itself near 1 (i.e., price dispersion continues to be minimal).
Relative to this minimum, either inflation or deflation results in a greater degree of price
dispersion; and once some degree of price dispersion exists, it is not possible to achieve zero
price dispersion again immediately, for any possible choice of the current inflation rate.
The system of equations (2.2) consists of eight equations per period, to determine the
eight endogenous variables {Πt, Yt, λbt , λst , Zt, bt,∆t}, given two more equations per period to
15Thus we abstract from any transactions role for the deposits that type s households hold with interme-
diaries. The model can easily be extended to allow deposits to supply transactions services, at the cost of
introducing an additional interest-rate spread into the model. Note, however, that neither our account of
the way in which the central bank controls short-term interest rates nor our account of the role of credit in
macroeconomic equilibrium depends on any monetary role for the liabilities of private intermediaries.
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determine the evolution of the interest rates {idt , ibt} (and hence of the credit spread). The
latter equations follow from the decisions of private intermediaries and of the central bank.
2.2 Financial Intermediaries
We assume an intermediary sector made up of identical, perfectly competitive firms. In-
termediaries take deposits, on which they promise to pay a riskless nominal return idt one
period later, and make one-period loans on which they demand a nominal interest rate of
ibt . An intermediary also chooses a quantity of reserves Mt to hold at the central bank, on
which it will receive a nominal interest yield of imt . Each intermediary takes as given all three
of these interest rates. We assume that arbitrage by intermediaries need not eliminate the
spread between ibt and i
d
t , for either of two reasons. On the one hand, resources are used in
the process of loan origination; and on the other hand, intermediaries may be unable to tell
the difference between good borrowers (who will repay their loans the next period) and bad
borrowers (who will be able to disappear without having to repay), and as a consequence
have to charge a higher interest rate to good and bad borrowers alike.
We suppose that origination of good loans in real quantity Lt requires an intermediary




t ≥ 0, and the function χt(L) may
shift from period to period for exogenous reasons. (While the intermediary is assumed to be
unable to discriminate between good and bad loans, it is able to predict the fraction of loans
that will be bad in the case of any given scale of lending activity on its part.) This scale of
operations also requires the intermediary to consume real resources Ξpt (Lt;mt) in the period
in which the loans are originated, where mt ≡ Mt/Pt, and Ξpt (L;m) is a convex function of
its two arguments, with ΞpLt ≥ 0,Ξpmt ≤ 0, ΞpLmt ≤ 0. We further suppose that for any scale
of operations L, there exists a finite satiation level of reserve balances m¯t(L), defined as the
lowest value of m for which Ξpmt(L;m) = 0. (Our convexity and sign assumptions then imply
that Ξpmt(L;m) = 0 for all m ≥ m¯t(L).) We assume the existence of a finite satiation level of
reserves in order for an equilibrium to be possible in which the policy rate is driven to zero,
a situation of considerable practical relevance at present that raises interesting theoretical
issues.
Given an intermediary’s choice of its scale of lending operations Lt and reserve balances
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mt to hold, we assume that it acquires real deposits dt in the maximum quantity that it
can repay (with interest at the competitive rate) from the anticipated returns on its assets
(taking into account the anticipated losses on bad loans). Thus it chooses dt such that
(1 + idt )dt = (1 + i
b
t)Lt + (1 + i
m
t )mt.
The deposits that it does not use to finance either loans or the acquisition of reserve balances,
dt −mt − Lt − χt(Lt)− Ξpt (Lt;mt),
are distributed as earnings to its shareholders. The intermediary chooses Lt and mt each




t . This implies that Lt and mt must
satisfy the first-order conditions








Equation (2.9) can be viewed as determining the equilibrium credit spread ωt as a function
ωt(Lt;mt) of the aggregate volume of private credit and the real supply of reserves. As
indicated above, a positive credit spread exists in equilibrium to the extent that Ξpt (L;m),
χt(L), or both are increasing in L. Equation (2.10) similarly indicates how the equilibrium
differential δmt between the interest paid on deposits and that paid on reserves at the central
bank is determined by the same two aggregate quantities.
In addition to these two equilibrium conditions that determine the two interest-rate
spreads in the model, the absolute level of (real) interest rates must be such as to equate the
supply and demand for credit. Market-clearing in the credit market requires that
bt = Lt + L
cb
t , (2.11)
where Lcbt represents real lending to the private sector by the central bank, as discussed
next. Equations (2.9)–(2.11) then provide three more equilibrium conditions per period, to
determine the three additional endogenous variables {ıdt , ibt , Lt} along with those discussed in
the previous section, given paths (or rules for the determination of) the central-bank policy
variables {Mt, imt , Lcbt }.
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2.3 Dimensions of Central-Bank Policy
In our model, the central bank’s liabilities consist of the reserves Mt (which also constitute
the monetary base in our simple model), on which it pays interest at the rate imt . These
liabilities in turn fund the central bank’s holdings of government debt, and any lending by
the central bank to type b households. We let Lcbt denote the real quantity of lending by
the central bank to the private sector; the central bank’s holdings of government debt are
then given by the residual mt − Lcbt . We can treat mt (or Mt) and Lcbt as the bank’s choice
variables, subject to the constraints
0 ≤ Lcbt ≤ mt. (2.12)






where bgt is the total outstanding real public debt, so that a positive quantity of public debt
remains in the portfolios of households. In the calculations below, however, we shall assume
that this last constraint is never binding. (We confirm this in our numerical examples.)
We assume that central-bank extension of credit other than through open-market pur-
chases of Treasury securities consumes real resources, just as in the case of private inter-
mediaries, and represent this resource cost by a function Ξcb(Lcbt ), that is increasing and
at least weakly convex, with Ξcb′(0) > 0, as is discussed further in section 4. The central
bank has one further independent choice to make each period, which is the rate of interest
imt to pay on reserves. We assume that if the central bank lends to the private sector, it
simply chooses the amount that it is willing to lend and auctions these funds, so that in
equilibrium it charges the same interest rate ibt on its lending that private intermediaries do;
this is therefore not an additional choice variable for the central bank. Similarly, the central
bank receives the market-determined yield idt on its holdings of government debt.
The interest rate idt at which intermediaries are able to fund themselves is determined
each period by the joint inequalities
mt ≥ mdt (Lt, δmt ), (2.13)
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δmt ≥ 0, (2.14)
together with the “complementary slackness” condition that at least one of (2.13) and (2.14)
must hold with equality each period. Here mdt (L, δ
m) is the demand for reserves defined by
(2.10), and defined to equal the satiation level m¯t(L) in the case that δ
m = 0. (Condition
(2.13) may hold only as an inequality, as intermediaries will be willing to hold reserves
beyond the satiation level as long as the opportunity cost δmt is zero.) We identify the rate i
d
t
at which intermediaries fund themselves with the central bank’s policy rate (e.g., the federal
funds rate, in the case of the US).
The central bank can influence the policy rate through two channels, its control of the
supply of reserves and its control of the interest rate paid on them. By varyingmt, the central
bank can change the equilibrium differential δmt , determined as the solution to (2.13)–(2.14).
And by varying imt , it can change the level of the policy rate i
d
t that corresponds to a
given differential. Through appropriate adjustment on both margins, the central bank can
control idt and i
m
t separately (subject to the constraint that i
m
t cannot exceed i
d
t ). We also
assume that for institutional reasons, it is not possible for the central bank to pay a negative
interest rate on reserves. (We may suppose that intermediaries have the option of holding
currency, earning zero interest, as a substitute for reserves, and that the second argument
of the resource cost function Ξpt (b;m) is actually the sum of reserve balances at the central
bank plus vault cash.) Hence the central bank’s choice of these variables is subject to the
constraints
0 ≤ imt ≤ idt . (2.15)
There are thus three independent dimensions along which central-bank policy can be
varied in our model: variation in the quantity of reserves Mt that are supplied; variation in
the interest rate imt paid on those reserves; and variation in the breakdown of central-bank
assets between government debt and lending Lcbt to the private sector. Alternatively, we can
specify the three independent dimensions as interest-rate policy, the central bank’s choice of
an operating target for the policy rate idt ; reserve-supply policy, the choice of Mt, which in
turn implies a unique rate of interest that must be paid on reserves in order for the reserve-
supply policy to be consistent with the bank’s target for the policy rate;16 and credit policy,
16We might choose to call the second dimension variation in the interest rate paid on reserves, which
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the central bank’s choice of the quantity of funds Lcbt to lend to the private sector.
17
We prefer this latter identification of the three dimensions of policy because in this
case our first dimension (interest-rate policy) corresponds to the sole dimension of policy
emphasized in many conventional analyses of optimal monetary policy, while the other two
dimensions are additional dimensions of policy introduced by our extension of the basic
New Keynesian model.18 Changes in central-bank policy along each of these dimensions
has consequences for the bank’s cash flow, but we abstract from any constraint on the joint
choice of the three variables associated with cash-flow concerns. (We assume that seignorage
revenues are simply turned over to the Treasury, where their only effect is to change the size
of lump-sum transfers to the households.)
Given that central-bank policy can be independently varied along each of these three
dimensions, we can independently discuss the criteria for policy to be optimal along each
would correspond to something that the Board of Governors makes an explicit decision about under current
US institutional arrangements, as is also true at most other central banks. But description of the second
dimension of policy as “reserve-supply policy” allows us to address the question of the value of “quantitative
easing” under this heading as well.
17Here we only consider the kind of credit policy that involves direct lending by the central bank to ultimate
borrowers, or (equivalently, in our model, since the loan market is competitive) targeted asset purchases.
Thus our “credit policy” is intended to represent, in a stylized way, the kind of programs that became an
important part of Fed policy after September 2008, such as the Commercial Paper Funding Facility mentioned
in section 1, or the Fed’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities. We do not take up the separate question of
what might be accomplished by central-bank lending to intermediaries rather than to ultimate borrowers, as
under the “liquidity facilities” that played such an important role in the Fed’s response to the financial crisis
up until September 2008. In our model, central-bank lending to intermediaries can also be effective; and as
with our analysis of credit policy below, the welfare consequences of such intervention will depend crucially
on whether financial disruptions involve increases in the real resource costs of private intermediation or not.
Other analyses that distinguish the effects of these two types of credit policy include Reis (2009) and Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010).
18Goodfriend (2009) similarly describes central-bank policy as involving three independent dimensions,
corresponding to our first three dimensions, and calls the first of those dimensions (the quantity of reserves,
or base money) “monetary policy.” We believe that this does not correspond to standard usage of the term
“monetary policy,” since the traditional focus of FOMC deliberations about monetary policy has been the
choice of an operating target for the policy rate, as is generally the case at other central banks as well. Reis
(2009) also distinguishes among the three dimensions of policy in terms similar to ours.
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dimension. Here we restrict our analysis to the two “unconventional” dimensions of pol-
icy, reserve-supply policy and credit policy. The consequences of heterogeneity and credit
frictions for interest-rate policy (i.e., conventional monetary policy) are addressed in Cu´rdia
and Woodford (2009a, 2009b). Of course, we have to make some assumption about interest-
rate policy when considering adjustments of policy along the other two dimensions; in some
of the analysis reported below, we assume that interest-rate policy is optimal (despite not
seeking here to characterize optimal interest-rate policy), while in other places we assume
a simple conventional specification for interest-rate policy (a “Taylor rule”). It is also true
that the changes in reserve-supply policy and credit policy have consequences for optimal
interest-rate policy; but these are not the concern of the present study, except to the extent
that they influence the optimal use of the unconventional policies themselves.
2.4 The Welfare Objective
In considering optimal policy, we take the objective of policy to be the maximization of





where the welfare contribution Ut each period weights the period utility of each of the two
types by their respective population fractions at each point in time. As shown in Cu´rdia
and Woodford (2009a),19 this can be written as
Ut = U(Yt,Ωt,Ξt,∆t; ξt), (2.17)
where Ωt is again the marginal-utility gap, Ωt ≡ λbt/λst ; Ξt is total resources consumed in
financial intermediation (also including resources used by the central bank, to the extent
19Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009a) analyze a special case of the present model, in which central-bank lending
and the role of central-bank liabilities in reducing the transactions costs of intermediaries are abstracted
from. However, the form of the welfare measure (2.17) depends only on the nature of the heterogeneity in
our model, and the assumed existence of a credit spread and of resources consumed by the intermediary
sector; the functions that determine how Ωt and Ξt are endogenously determined are irrelevant for this
calculation, and those are the only parts of the model that are generalized in this paper. Hence the form of
the welfare objective in terms of these variables remains the same.
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that it lends to the private sector, as discussed further in sections 4 and 5); ∆t is the index
of price dispersion appearing in (2.6)–(2.8); and ξt is a vector of exogenous disturbances to
preferences, technology, and government purchases.
It may be useful to briefly explain why the arguments in (2.17) suffice, and the way
each of them affects welfare. In order to derive the period objective in (2.17), we sum the
utility of consumption and disutility of labor for the two types, weighting each type τ by
its population fraction piτ . The average utility of consumption is equal to
∑
τ piτu
τ (cτt ; ξt),
which depends on cbt , c
s
t , and exogenous shocks to preferences (i.e., to spending opportunities).
But it is possible to solve uniquely for cbt , c
s
t given values for Yt,Ωt,Ξt, and the exogenous
disturbances (including Gt), using (2.2) and the definition of Ωt; hence the arguments of
(2.17) suffice to determine this component of average utility. The total disutility of work can
be written as a product of factors
Λ(Ωt)v˜(Yt; ξt)∆t,
where v˜(Yt; ξt) would be the disutility of supplying quantity Yt of the composite good, if a
common quantity yt(j) = Yt were produced of each of the individual goods, and if the labor
effort involved in producing them were efficiently divided between households of the two
types;20 and Λ(Ωt) is a distortion factor that arises as a result of differing marginal utilities
of income of the two types (which means that their relative wages no longer correctly reflect
their relative marginal disutilities of work), leading to an inefficient division of equilibrium
work effort across the two types of households. Given these other two factors, the total
disutility of work is proportional to ∆t because greater price dispersion results in a less
efficient composition of the output that comprises a quantity Yt of the composite good.
(Note that except for the presence of the factor Λ(Ωt), the total disutility of work is the
same as in the representative household model.) Hence the arguments of (2.17) also suffice
for the calculation of this term, and so for the calculation of the period t contribution to
average utility.
From this discussion, it should be evident how each of the four endogenous variables in
(2.17) affects welfare. Given the values of the other variables, increasing Yt increases the
20Note that this disutility will depend both on the state of productivity and on preferences regarding labor
supply, both of which are elements of the vector ξt.
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average utility of consumption but also the total disutility of work, as in the representative
household model. Under standard assumptions about preferences and technology, there is
diminishing marginal utility from consumption and increasing marginal disutility of work
as Yt increases, so that there should be an interior maximum for Ut as a function of Yt
(the location of which will depend on preferences, technology, government purchases, etc.).
And given the values of the other variables, Ut is monotonically decreasing in ∆t. Both
of these effects are similar to those in the representative household model, where {Yt,∆t}
are the only endogenous variables that matter for welfare.21 With heterogeneity and credit
frictions, additional variables become relevant as well. Given values of the other variables,
Ut is monotonically decreasing in both Ωt and Ξt. Average utility is reduced by an increase
in Ωt because both the efficiency of the allocation of total private expenditure across the two
types and the efficiency of the allocation of total work effort across the two types is reduced;
it is reduced by an increase in Ξt because, for given values of Yt and Gt, a higher value of Ξt
means less total private expenditure and hence lower values of both cbt and c
s
t (given a value
for Ωt).
Other variables matter for welfare purely through their effects on the paths of these four
endogenous variables. For example, the level of real bank reserves matters in our model,
because of its effect on the resources Ξt consumed by financial intermediaries. Central-bank
credit policy can matter in our model as well, to the extent that it reduces credit spreads
and as a consequence the size of the equilibrium marginal-utility gap Ωt. We turn now to
an analysis of the optimal use of these additional dimensions of policy in the light of this
objective.
3 Reserve-Supply Policy
We shall first consider optimal policy with regard to the supply of reserves, taking as given
(for now) the way in which the central bank chooses its operating target for the policy rate idt ,
21Because the evolution of price dispersion is determined entirely by the path of inflation, as indicated by
(2.8), we can alternatively state that aggregate output and inflation are the only endogenous variables that
matter for welfare in the representative-household model.
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and the state-contingent level of central-bank lending Lcbt to the private sector. Under fairly
weak assumptions, we obtain a very simple result: optimal policy requires that intermediaries
be satiated in reserves, i.e., that Mt/Pt ≥ ¯mt(Lt) at all times.
For levels of reserves below the satiation point, an increase in the supply of reserves has
two effects that are relevant for welfare: on the one hand, the resource cost of financial
intermediation Ξpt is reduced (for a given level of lending by the intermediary sector); and
on the other hand, the credit spread ωt is reduced (again, for a given level of lending) as
a consequence of (2.9). Each of these effects raises the value of the objective (2.16); note
that reductions in credit spreads increase welfare because of their effect on the path of the
marginal-utility gap Ωt.
22 Hence an increase in the supply of reserves is unambiguously
desirable, in any period in which they remain below the satiation level.23Once reserves are at
or above the satiation level, however, further increases reduce neither the resource costs of
intermediaries nor equilibrium credit spreads (as in this case Ξpmt = Ξ
p
Lmt = 0), so that there
would be no further improvement in welfare. Hence policy is optimal along this dimension
if and only if Mt/Pt ≥ ¯mt(Lt) at all times,24 so that
Ξpmt(Lt;mt) = 0. (3.1)
This is just another example in which the familiar “Friedman Rule” for “the optimum
quantity of money” (Friedman, 1969) applies. Note, however, that our result has no con-
sequences for interest-rate policy. While the Friedman rule is sometimes taken to imply a
strong result about the optimal control of short-term nominal interest rates — namely, that
the nominal interest rate should equal zero at all times — the efficiency condition (3.1),
together with the equilibrium relation (2.10), implies only that the interest-rate differential
δmt should equal zero at all times. With zero interest on reserves, this would also require
22Log-linearization of equations (2.3) can be used to show that, up to this log-linear approximation, log
deviations of the marginal-utility gap should equal a forward-looking moving average of expected deviations
of the credit spread from its steady-state level; see Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009a).
23The discussion here assumes that the upper bound in (2.12) is not a binding constraint. But if that
constraint does bind, then an increase in the supply of reserves relaxes the constraint, and this too increases
welfare, so that the conclusion in the text is unchanged.
24To be more precise, policy is optimal if and only if (3.1) is satisfied and the upper bound in (2.12) does
not bind. Both conditions will be satisfied by any quantity of reserves above some finite level.
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that idt = 0 at all times; but given that the central bank is free to set any level of interest on
reserves consistent with (2.15), the efficiency condition (3.1) actually implies no restriction
upon either the average level of the degree of state-contingency of the central bank’s target
for the policy rate idt .
3.1 Is a Reserve Supply Target Needed?
Our result about the importance of ensuring an adequate supply of reserves might suggest
that the question of the correct target level of reserves at each point in time should receive
the same degree of attention at meetings of the FOMC as the question of the correct op-
erating target for the federal funds rate. But deliberations of that kind are not needed in
order to ensure fulfillment of the optimality criterion (3.1). For the efficiency condition can
alternatively be stated (using (2.10)) as requiring that idt = i
m
t at all times. Reserves should
be supplied to the point at which the policy rate falls to the level of the interest rate paid on
reserves, or, in a formulation that is more to the point, interest should be paid on reserves
at the central bank’s target for the policy rate.
Given a rule for setting an operating target for idt (discussed in the next section), i
m
t




When the central bank acts to implement its target for the policy rate through open-market
operations, it will automatically have to adjust the supply of reserves so as to satisfy (3.1).
But this does not require a central bank’s monetary policy committee (the FOMC in the
case of the US) to deliberate about an appropriate target for reserves at each meeting;
once the target for the policy rate is chosen (and the interest rate to be paid on reserves is
determined by that, through condition (3.2), the quantity of reserves that must be supplied
to implement the target can be determined by the bank staff in charge of carrying out the
necessary interventions (the trading desk at the New York Fed, in the case of the US), on
the basis of a more frequent monitoring of market conditions than is possible on the part of
the monetary policy committee.
One obvious way to ensure that the efficiency condition (3.2) is satisfied is to adopt a
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routine practice of automatically paying interest on reserves at a rate that is tied to the
current operating target for the policy rate. This is already the practice of many central
banks outside the US. At some of those banks, the fixed spread between the target for the
policy rate and the rate paid on overnight balances at the central bank is quite small (for
example, 25 basis points in the case of the Bank of Canada); in the case of New Zealand, the
interest rate paid on overnight balances is the policy rate itself. There are possible arguments
(relating to considerations not reflected in our simple model) according to which the optimal
spread might be larger than zero, but it is likely in any event to be desirable to maintain a
constant small spread, rather than treating the question of the interest rate to be paid on
reserves as a separate, discretionary policy decision to be made at each meeting of the policy
committee. Apart from the efficiency gains modeled here, such a system should also help to
facilitate the central bank’s control of the policy rate (Goodfriend, 2002; Woodford, 2003,
chap. 1, sec. 3).
3.2 Is there a Role for “Quantitative Easing”?
While our analysis implies that it is desirable to ensure that the supply of reserves never falls
below a certain lower bound m¯t(Lt), it also implies that there is no benefit from supplying
reserves beyond that level. There is, however, one important exception to this assertion: it
can be desirable to supply reserves beyond the satiation level if this is necessary in order
to make the optimal quantity of central bank lending to the private sector Lcbt consistent
with (2.12). This qualification is important in thinking about the desirability of the massive
expansion in the supply of reserves by the Fed since September 2008, as shown in Figure 1.
As can be seen from Figure 2, the increase in reserves occurred only once the Fed decided to
expand the various newly-created liquidity and credit facilities beyond the scale that could
be financed simply by reducing its holdings of Treasury securities (as had been its policy
over the previous year).25
25Bernanke (2009) distinguishes between the Federal Reserve policy of “credit easing” and the type of
“quantitative easing” practiced by the Bank of Japan earlier in the decade, essentially on this ground.
Shiratsuka (2009) distinguishes between “pure credit easing” and “pure quantitative easing” in the way that
we have proposed, but argues that the actual “unconventional policies” of central banks, including both the
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Some have argued, instead, that further expansion of the supply of reserves beyond the
level needed to bring the policy rate down to the level of interest paid on reserves is an
important additional tool of policy in its own right — one of particular value precisely when
a central bank is no longer able to further reduce its operating target for the policy rate,
owing to the zero lower bound (as at present in the US and many other countries). It is
sometimes proposed that when the zero lower bound is reached, it is desirable for a central
bank’s policy committee to shift from deliberations about an interest-rate target to a target
for the supply of bank reserves, as under the Bank of Japan’s policy of “quantitative easing”
during the period between March 2001 and March 2006.
Our model provides no support for the view that such a policy should be effective in
stimulating aggregate demand. Indeed, it is possible to state an irrelevance proposition for
quantitative easing in the context of our model. Let the three dimensions of central-bank
policy be described by functions that specify the operating target for the policy rate, the
supply of reserves, the interest rate to be paid on reserves, and the quantity of central-bank
credit as functions of macroeconomic conditions.
For the sake of concreteness, we may suppose that each of these variables is to be deter-
mined by a Taylor-type rule,
idt = φ
id(pit, Yt, Lt; ξt),
Mt/Pt = φ
m(pit, Yt, Lt; ξt),
imt = φ
im(pit, Yt, Lt; ξt),
Lcbt = φ
L(pit, Yt, Lt; ξt),
where the functions are such that constraints (2.12)–(2.15) are satisfied for all values of
the arguments. (Here the vector of exogenous disturbances ξt upon which the reaction
functions may depend includes the exogenous factors that shift the function Ξpt (L;m).)
Then our result is that given the three functions φid(·), φim(·), and φL(·), the set of pro-
cesses {pit, Yt, Lt, bt, idt , ibt ,Ωt,∆t} that constitute possible rational expectations equilibria is
Bank of Japan in 2001-06 and the Federal Reserve during the current crisis, are mixtures of the two pure
types. Ueda (2009) similarly argues that many central banks represent mixed cases.
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the same, independently of the choice of the function φm(·), as long as the specification of
φm(·) is consistent with the other three functions (in the sense that (2.12) and (2.13) are
necessarily satisfied, and that (2.13) holds with equality in all cases where (2.14) is a strict
inequality).26
Of course, the stipulation that φm(·) be consistent with the other functions uniquely
determines what the function must be for all values of the arguments for which the functions
id(·) and im(·) imply that δmt > 0. However the class of policies considered allows for an
arbitrary degree of expansion of reserves beyond the satiation level in the region where those
functions imply that δmt = 0, and in particular, for an arbitrary degree of quantitative easing
when the zero bound is reached (i.e., when idt = i
m
t = 0). The class of policies considered
includes the popular proposal under which the quantity of excess reserves should depend on
the degree to which a standard Taylor rule (unconstrained by the zero bound) would call for
a negative policy rate. Our result implies that there should be no benefits from such policies.
Our result might seem to be contradicted by the analysis of Auerbach and Obstfeld (2004),
in which an open market operation that expands the money supply is found to stimulate real
activity even when the economy is at the zero bound at the time of the monetary expansion.
But their thought experiment does not correspond to pure quantitative easing of the kind
contemplated in the above proposition, because they specify monetary policy in terms of a
path for the money supply, and the policy change that they consider is one that permanently
increases the money supply, so that it remains higher after the economy has exited from the
“liquidity trap” in which the zero bound is temporarily binding. The contemplated policy
change is therefore not consistent with an unchanged reaction function φid(·) for the policy
rate, and the effects of the intervention can be understood to be the consequences of the
commitment to a different future interest-rate policy.
Our result only implies that quantitative easing should be irrelevant under two condi-
tions: that the increase in reserves finances an increase in central-bank holdings of Treasury
securities, rather than an increase in central-bank lending to the private sector; and that the
policy implies no change in the way that people should expect future interest-rate policy to
26This result generalizes the irrelevance result for quantitative easing in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)
to a model with heterogeneity and credit frictions.
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be conducted. Our model does allow for real effects of an increase in central-bank lending
Lcbt financed by an increase in the supply of reserves, in the case that private-sector financial
intermediation is inefficient;27 but the real effects of the increased central-bank lending in
that case are the same whether the lending is financed by an increase in the supply of reserves
or by a reduction in central-bank holdings of Treasury securities. Our model also allows for
real effects of an announcement that interest-rate policy in the future will be different, as in
the case where a central bank commits itself not to return immediately to its usual Taylor
rule as soon as the zero bound ceases to bind, but promises instead to maintain policy ac-
commodation for some time after it would become possible to comply with the Taylor rule
(as discussed in the next section). But such a promise (if credible and correctly understood
by the private sector) should increase output and prevent deflation to the same extent even
if it implies no change in policy during the period when the zero lower bound binds.
While our definition of quantitative easing may seem a narrow one, the policy of the Bank
of Japan during the period 2001-2006 fits our definition fairly closely. The BOJ’s policy
involved the adoption of a series of progressively higher quantitative targets for the supply
of reserves, and the aim of the policy was understood to be to increase the monetary base,
rather than to allow the BOJ to acquire any particular type of assets. The assets purchased
consisted primarily Japanese government securities and bills issued by commercial banks;
while there were also some more “unconventional” asset purchases under the quantitative
easing policy — direct purchases of asset-backed securities and of stocks — the size of these
operations was quite small relative to the total increase in the supply of reserves shown in
Figure 4.28 Finally, there was no suggestion that the targets of policy after the end of the
27This result differs from that obtained in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), where changes in the compo-
sition of the assets on the central bank’s balance sheet are also shown to be irrelevant. That stronger result
depends on the assumption of a representative household as in the earlier paper, or alternatively, frictionless
financial intermediation, as discussed in section 1.
28According to Bank of Japan statistics, these “unconventional” purchases had a value only slightly greater
than 2 trillion yen at their maximum, whereas the total increase in the monetary base during the quantitative
easing (QE) period was in excess of 45 trillion yen. For more detailed discussion of the different aspects of
the BOJ policy during the period, and an attempt to separate the effects of targeted asset purchases from
those of quantitative easing, see Ueda (2009). Shiratsuka (2009) provides additional information.
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zero-interest-rate period would be any different than before; there was no commitment to
maintain the increased quantity of base money in circulation permanently, and indeed, once
it was judged time to end the zero-interest-rate policy, the supply of reserves was rapidly
contracted again, as also shown in Figure 4.
Our theory suggests that expansion of the supply of reserves under such circumstances
should have little effect on aggregate demand, and this seems to have been the case. For
example, as is also shown in Figure 4, despite an increase in the monetary base of 60 percent
during the first two years of the quantitative easing policy, and an eventual increase of nearly
75 percent, nominal GDP never increased at all (relative to its March 2001 level) during
the entire five years of the policy.29 Apart from the absence of the effects on aggregate
expenditure that simple quantity-theoretic reasoning would have predicted, there was also
little evidence of effects of the policy on longer-term interest rates (the channel through
which it might have been expected to ultimately influence aggregate expenditure). Those
studies of Japan’s experience with quantitative easing that find some reduction in longer-
term interest rates attribute this mainly to successful signalling by the BOJ of an intention
to maintain the zero-interest-rate policy, and find little effect on bond yields of the increase
in the supply of reserves itself (Okina and Shiratsuka, 2004; Oda and Ueda, 2007; Ugai,
2007; Ueda, 2009).30 Of course, it is perfectly consistent with our model that signals about
future interest-rate policy can be an effective channel through which a central bank can seek
to provide further monetary stimulus even when the current policy rate is constrained by
the zero lower bound.31
29As indicated in Figure 4, over the first two years of the quantitative easing policy, nominal GDP fell
by more than 4 percent, despite extremely rapid growth of base money. While nominal GDP recovered
thereafter, it remained below its 2001:Q1 level over the entire period until 2006:Q4, three quarters after the
official end of quantitative easing, by which time the monetary base had been reduced again by more than
20 percent. Moreover, even if the growth of nominal GDP after 2003:Q1 is regarded as a delayed effect of the
growth in the monetary base two years earlier, this delayed nominal GDP growth was quite modest relative
to the size of the expansion in base money.
30Baba et al. (2006) find some effects of BOJ purchases of commercial paper on the spreads associated
with those particular types of paper. But this is really more evidence of the effectiveness of targeted asset
purchases than of effectiveness of quantitative easing as such. See also the discussion by Ueda (2009).
31See Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009b) for further discussion of the
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4 Central-Bank Asset Purchases: “Treasuries Only”?
We turn now to another of our three independent dimensions of central-bank policy, namely,
adjustment of the composition of the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet, taking
as given the overall size of the balance sheet (determined by the reserve-supply decision
discussed above). In this section, we take for granted that reserve-supply policy is being
conducted in the way recommended in the previous section, i.e., that the rate of interest on
reserves will satisfy (3.2) at all times. In this case, we can replace the function Ξpt (Lt;mt) by
Ξ¯pt (Lt) ≡ Ξpt (Lt; m¯t(Lt))
and the function ωt(Lt;mt), defined by the left-hand side of (2.9), by
ω¯t(Lt) ≡ ωt(Lt; m¯t(Lt)),
since there will be satiation in reserves at all times.32 Using these functions to specify the
equilibrium evolution of Ξpt and ωt as functions of the evolution of aggregate private credit,
we can then write the equilibrium conditions of the model without any reference to the
quantity of reserves or to the interest rate paid on reserves. We wish to consider alternative
possible state-contingent evolutions for central-bank lending {Lcbt }, under various maintained
assumptions about interest-rate policy (made explicit below).
According to the traditional doctrine of “Treasuries only,” the central bank should not
vary the composition of its balance sheet as a policy tool; instead, it should avoid both
balance-sheet risk and the danger of politicization by only holding (essentially riskless)
Treasury securities at all times, while varying the size of its balance sheet to achieve its
stabilization goals for the aggregate economy.33 And even apart from these prudential con-
cerns, if private financial markets can be relied upon to allocate capital efficiently, it is hard
to argue that there would be any substantial value to allowing the central bank this addi-
tional dimension of policy. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) present a formal irrelevance
proposition in the context of a representative-household general-equilibrium model; in their
effectiveness of and ideal use of this aspect of policy.
32Even if at some times mt exceeds m¯t(Lt), this will not affect the values of Ξ
p
t or ωt.
33See Goodfriend (2009) for discussion of this view and a warning about the dangers of departing from it.
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model, the assets purchased by the central bank have no consequences for the equilibrium
evolution of output, inflation or asset prices — and this is true regardless of whether the
central bank purchases long-term or short-term assets, nominal or real assets, riskless or
risky assets, and so on. And even in a model with heterogeneity of the kind considered here,
the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet would be irrelevant if we were to assume
frictionless private financial intermediation, since private intermediaries would be willing to
adjust their portfolios to perfectly offset any changes in the portfolio of the central bank, as
discussed in section 1.
This irrelevance result does not hold, however, in the presence of credit frictions of the
kind assumed in section 2. Here we illustrate the potential use of central-bank credit as
an instrument of stabilization policy in a numerical example. After establishing that credit
policy can be used for macroeconomic stabilization in principle, we then consider the subtler
question of whether it is desirable to do so.
4.1 Numerical Calibration
We shall illustrate our main points through an analysis of the quantitative effects of alter-
native types of purely financial disturbances in a calibrated model. The numerical values
for parameters used in our calculations are summarized in Table 1. They are essentially the
same as those used in the numerical analysis in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009a), where they
are discussed in greater detail. The one important difference is that here we calibrate the
model so that the steady-state real return on deposits (identified with the real federal funds
rates, for purposes of the empirical interpretation of the model) is 3.0 percent per annum. In
Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009a), this rate is calibrated to be 4 percent per annum (1 percent
per quarter), for the sake of using a round number (when expressed as a quarterly rate). But
because we are interested in the consequences of the zero lower bound on the policy rate in
some of the calculations reported below, the question of how far the steady-state policy rate
is from the lower bound is of non-trivial import. Hence we have here adopted a value for
this target that is closer to the average historical level of the real federal funds rate. Several
of the numbers in Table 1 are also slightly different from those reported in the appendix
to Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009a), but all of these are consequences of the change in the
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calibration target for the steady-state real policy rate, given unchanged numerical values for
the other calibration targets.
Our numerical analysis requires the introduction of functional forms for preferences, pro-
duction technology, and the functions that define the financial frictions. The utility from
expenditure is assumed to be of the form









for τ = b, s, where for each type, στ > 0 would be the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of expenditure if one’s type were expected to remain unchanged, and C¯τt is an exogenous
type-specific disturbance, indicating variation in aggregate spending opportunities. The
quantity c is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of the household’s purchases of the various individual
goods, with elasticity of substitution θ > 1, assumed to be the same for households of both
types.34 The disutility of work is assumed to be of the form




for τ = b, s, where ν > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply for both types,
and H¯t is an exogenous disturbance, also common to both types. (Note that the disutility
of work is assumed to be the same for both types, except for the multiplicative factors ψτ ,
that differ across types so as to imply identical steady-state labor supplies for the two types,
despite their differing steady-state marginal utilities of income.) The production technology
for each good j is assumed to be of the form
yt(j) = Atht(j)
1/φ,
where φ > 1 indicates the degree of diminishing returns, and At is an exogenous productivity
factor, common to all goods.
Many of the model’s parameters are also parameters of the basic New Keynesian model,
and in the case of these parameters we assume similar numerical values as in the numerical
34The government is also assumed to purchase an exogenous quantity of the composite good, defined using
the same aggregator, so that the government’s elasticity of substitution among individual goods is also equal
to θ. This makes the elasticity of each firm’s demand curve independent of the composition of demand.
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Table 1: Numerical parameter values used.
pib 0.5 sb 0.798 (θ − 1)−1 0.15 τ¯ 0.2
δ 0.975 ss 0.602 φ
−1 0.75 Ξ¯/Y¯ 0.0003
β 0.990 σb 13.6 α 0.66 χ¯/L¯ 0
ν 0.105 σs 2.72 b¯





1.22 b¯/Y¯ 3.2 η 51.6
analysis of that model in Woodford (2003, Table 5.1.), which in turn are based on the
empirical model of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Specifically, the values assumed for
ν, θ, and φ in Table 1 are the same as in Rotemberg and Woodford, and the average of the
elasticities στ is chosen so as to imply the same interest-elasticity of aggregate expenditure
as in Rotemberg and Woodford.35The value assumed for α, the fraction of goods prices that
remain unchanged from one quarter to the next, is also the same as in Rotemberg and
Woodford. The value assumed for β is also the same (to three decimal places) as the one
used by Rotemberg and Woodford, though for a different reason: the value reported in the
table is required by our calibration target for the steady-state real policy rate, discussed
above.36
The new parameters that are needed for the present model are those relating to hetero-
geneity or to the specification of the credit frictions. The parameters relating to heterogeneity
are the fraction pib of households that are borrowers, the degree of persistence δ of a house-
hold’s “type”, the steady-state expenditure level of borrowers relative to savers, and the
interest-elasticity of expenditure of borrowers relative to that of savers, σb/σs.
37
35To be precise, these are chosen so that the coefficient σ¯ defined in the Appendix has the same value as
the coefficient denoted σ in Table 5.1 of Woodford (2003).
36Our calibration target for the steady-state real policy rate is slightly lower than the one assumed by
Rotemberg and Woodford, but the credit frictions in our model require a rate of time preference that is
slightly higher than the steady-state real policy rate, unlike the model of Rotemberg and Woodford; and the
consequences of these two changes for the assumed value of β essentially cancel one another.
37Another new parameter that matters as a consequence of heterogeneity is the steady-state level of
government debt relative to GDP, b¯g/Y¯ ; here we assume that b¯g = 0.
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In the calculations reported here, we assume that pib = pis = 0.5, so that there are an
equal number of borrowers and savers. We assume that δ = 0.975, so that the expected
time until a household has access to the insurance agency (and its type is drawn again) is 10
years. This means that the expected path of the spread between lending and deposit rates
for 10 years or so into the future affects current spending decisions, but that expectations
regarding the spread several decades in the future are nearly irrelevant.
We calibrate the model so that private expenditure is 0.7 of total output in steady state,
and furthermore calibrate the degree of heterogeneity in the steady-state expenditure of the
two types so that the implied steady-state debt b¯ is equal to 80 percent of annual steady-state
output.38 This value matches the median ratio of private (non-financial, non-government,
non-mortgage) debt to GDP over the period 1986-2008.39 This requires the values of sb and
ss shown in the table, where sτ ≡ c¯τ/Y¯ is the steady-state expenditure share for each type
τ (using bars to denote the steady-state values of variables).
We assume an average intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the two types that is
the same as that of the representative household in the model of Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997), as mentioned above, and determine the individual values of στ for the two types
on the assumption that σb/σs is equal to 5. This is an arbitrary choice, though the fact
that borrowers are assumed to have a greater willingness to substitute intertemporally is
important, as this results in the prediction that an exogenous tightening of monetary policy
(a positive intercept shift added to (4.2)) results in a reduction in the equilibrium volume of
credit bt (see Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2009a). This is consistent with the VAR evidence on
the effects of an identified monetary policy shock presented in Lown and Morgan (1992).40
It is also necessary to specify the unperturbed values of the functions ω(b) and Ξ(b)
38In our quarterly model, this means that b¯/Y¯ = 3.2.
39We exclude mortgage debt when calibrating the degree of heterogeneity of preferences in our model,
since mortgage debt is incurred in order to acquire an asset, rather than to consume current produced goods
in excess of current income.
40It is also consistent with the evidence in Den Haan et al. (2004) for the effects of a monetary shock on
consumer credit, though commercial and industrial loans are shown to rise. The result for C&I loans may
reflect substitution of firms toward bank credit owing to decreased availability of other sources of credit,
rather than an actual increase in borrowing; see Bernanke and Gertler (1995) on this point.
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that describe the financial frictions, in addition to making clear what kinds of random
perturbations of these functions we wish to consider when analyzing the effects of “financial
shocks.” In the absence of shocks, we assume that χt(L) = 0, so that all loans are expected
to be repaid, and the credit spread is due purely to the resource costs of intermediation.
We assume an intermediation technology such that when intermediaries hold reserves at or
above the satiation level (as occurs in equilibrium under an optimal reserve-supply policy,
assumed in all of the numerical exercises reported in this section)
Ξ¯p(L) = Ξ˜pLη (4.1)
in the absence of shocks. We assume that η > 1, so that the marginal cost of intermediation
is increasing; this corresponds to the idea of a finite lending capacity at a given point in
time, due to scarce factors such as intermediary capital and expertise that are here treated
as exogenous.41
In the numerical results reported here, we assume more specifically a value of η that
implies that a one percent increase in private lending implies an increase in the marginal
cost of intermediation, and hence in the equilibrium credit spread, of one percentage point
(per annum). This implies fairly inelastic credit supply by the private sector, but we believe
that this is the case of greatest interest for the exercises here, both because private credit
supply is often asserted to be quite inelastic during financial crises, and because this is in any
event the assumption most favorable to a potential role for central-bank credit policy, as in
this case a substitution of central-bank lending for private lending to even a modest degree
can lower the marginal cost of private lending and hence the equilibrium credit spread.42
We are interested in biasing our results in this direction, not to pre-judge the desirability
of central-bank lending, but because our results show in any event that the justification for
41The assumption that η > 1 also allows our model to match the prediction of VAR estimates that an
unexpected tightening of monetary policy is associated with a slight reduction in credit spreads (see, e.g.,
Lown and Morgan, 2002, and Gerali et al., 2008). See Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009a) for comparison with a
model with a linear resource cost function.
42In the case that the private intermediary sector has a constant marginal cost, rather than one increasing
with the volume of private lending, then central-bank lending will reduce the equilibrium credit spread only
to the extent that it completely replaces private lending, by lending at a rate that is too low to be profitable
for private intermediaries at any positive scale of operation.
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active credit policy is often fairly modest, even in the case of financial disturbances that
increase credit spreads by a significant amount. It is most interesting to observe that this
is true even under the assumption of quite a large value for η; in the case of a more modest
value of η, then both the shadow value of allowing active credit policy (relaxing the constraint
that Lcbt = 0) and the optimal scale of central-bank lending in response to shocks will in all
cases be substantially smaller than the values reported below.
Finally, we specify the unperturbed value of Ξ˜p so that the steady-state credit spread
ω¯ equal to 2.0 percentage points per annum, following Mehra et al., (2008). Combined
with our assumption that “types” persist for 10 years on average, this implies a steady-
state “marginal-utility gap” Ω¯ ≡ λ¯b/λ¯s = 1.22, so that there would be a non-trivial welfare
gain from transferring further resources from savers to borrowers. Because of the degree
of convexity assumed for the intermediation technology, this corresponds to a steady-state
resource cost of financial intermediation Ξ¯ that is much smaller than 2 percent per year of the
steady-state level of private lending, as shown in Table 1;43 hence in our parameterization,
the credit spread represents mainly rents earned by private intermediaries, owing to the
scarcity of whatever factor allows only particular firms to engage in this activity.
4.2 Credit Policy and Stabilization
We first demonstrate that according to our model, central-bank credit policy can in principle
be a highly effective tool for macroeconomic stabilization. In particular, it can be used to
offset at least some of the effects of a “purely financial” disturbance, that shifts the relation
ω¯t(L), by shifting the relationship that would otherwise exist between private borrowing bt
and private lending Lt, so that the relationship between ωt and bt need not change. In the
numerical examples considered in Figures 5 and 6, we assume that χt(L) = χ˜tL, and consider
the effects of an exogenous increase in the factor χt.
44 Thus we assume that the fraction
of loans that are not repaid is independent of the volume of lending, but that it varies over
43The value for Ξ¯ reported in the table represents the steady-state value of Ξpt , as we assume no central-
bank lending to the private sector in the steady state: L¯cb = 0.
44This is the type of disturbance that is called an “additive χ” shock in the next section.
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time for exogenous reasons. We assume that
χt = chi0 ρ
t
for all t ≥ 0, where χ0 > 0 determines the size of the shock, and in our numerical examples
we assume that ρ = 0.9.
Let us suppose that interest-rate policy is specified by a “Taylor rule” of the form
idt = max{r¯d + φpipit + φyYˆt, 0}, (4.2)
where our specification assumes that the central bank’s operating target must at all times
respect the zero lower bound on short-term nominal interest rates. Here pit ≡ log Πt is the
inflation rate, Yˆt ≡ log(Yt/Y¯ ), and r¯d is the steady-state real policy rate,45 so that the policy
rule is consistent with the zero-inflation steady state (discussed above) in the absence of
disturbances. In the numerical results shown in Figure 5 and subsequently, the response
coefficients are assigned the values φpi = 2, φy = 1/4, in rough accordance with estimates of
US monetary policy in recent decades.46
As a simple example of endogenous credit policy, let us suppose that the central bank’s
lending to the private sector (or purchases of illiquid assets) is given by a rule of the form
Lcbt = −γ(Lt − L¯), (4.3)
where L¯ is the level of private lending in the zero-inflation steady state with zero central-
bank credit, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is a coefficient indicating the degree to which the central bank
increases its lending to the private sector to offset an observed decrease in private lending.47
The rule is specified so that the central bank adheres to a policy of “Treasuries only” in
45As explained above, we calibrate the model so that 1 + r¯d = (1.03)1/4.
46These are the baseline parameter values used in the numerical analysis of the representative-household
New Keynesian model in Woodford (2003, chap. 4). We use these parameter values in our analysis in
Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009a) of the model’s implications for the effects of disturbances when monetary
policy follows a Taylor rule, in order to allow direct comparison with the results shown in Woodford (2003)
for the basic New Keynesian model.
47Of course, the decrease in private lending in equilibrium will not be independent of the central bank’s
intervention; as Figures 5 and 6 show, for a given size of disturbance, more lending by the central bank
results in a greater contraction of private lending.
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the steady state, and so central-bank credit policy is eventually phased out again following
the disturbance. In the case that γ = 0, it adheres to “Treasuries only” even in response
to the financial disturbance; in the opposite limiting case, in which γ = 1, the central bank
uses credit policy so aggressively as to completely stabilize private borrowing bt at the level
b¯ = L¯.48
Figure 5 plots the impulse responses of several endogenous variables to a disturbance
of the kind proposed, for each of several different values of γ. In the figure, a value of χ˜0
is assumed that increases the value of ω¯0(L¯) by 4 percentage points per annum.
49 In
the case of no credit policy (γ = 0), and an interest-rate policy that does not respond to
the disturbance except to the extent that it affects inflation or output, such a disturbance
contracts real activity and creates deflation, resulting in an immediate cut in the policy
rate.50 The reduction in the policy rate is not as large as the increase in the credit spread
ωt, so the interest rate faced by borrowers increases; given that expected inflation falls at the
same time, the increase in the real rate faced by borrowers is even greater. In addition to
the distortions implied by the effects of the disturbance on aggregate output and inflation,
there is also a substantial distortion of the composition of expenditure, as type b expenditure
falls sharply while type s expenditure actually increases; since by hypothesis, there has been
no change in the marginal utility of each type of expenditure, this shift in composition is
inefficient.
48In order to determine the general-equilibrium effects of this policy, it is also necessary to make an
assumption about the resources (if any) consumed by the central bank’s lending operations. For reasons dis-
cussed in the next section, we do assume that central-bank lending to the private sector consumes resources,
though central-bank purchases of Treasuries involve no costs. The cost parameter Ξ˜cb is set in the same way
as in Figure xx, discussed below. However, the precise value of this parameter has very little effect on the
responses shown in Figure 5.
49Even in the absence of active credit policy, this increases the equilibrium credit spread by less than 3
percentage points, because of the endogenous response of the equilibrium credit spread to the reduction in
private lending.
50Note that in the case of a disturbance of this size, the policy rate is cut by about two percentage points,
but not so far as to cause the zero lower bound to become an issue. Hence for any small enough value of χ˜0,
the responses will look like those in Figure 5, with the size of all responses scaled in proportion to the value
of χ˜0.
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The figure shows that active credit policy can mitigate each of the effects of the distur-
bance just mentioned. If γ > 0, private borrowing bt falls by less in equilibrium, while at the
same time the credit spread ωt increases by less (since private lending Lt actually falls more
if the central bank substitutes for private lenders). As a consequence, the marginal-utility
gap Ωt increases less, there is less distortion of the composition of private expenditure, there
is less contraction of aggregate expenditure and of output, and there is less deflation. More-
over, there is less need for interest-rate cuts to head off the output contraction and deflation:
output and inflation fall less even though the policy rate is cut less aggressively. In the
limiting case in which γ = 1, there is virtually no change in any of the endogenous variables,
except that Lt is falling and L
cb
t is increasing (with total lending unchanged).
51 In this case,
credit policy succeeds to a large extent in eliminating the instability that would otherwise
result from the financial disturbance; moreover, it virtually eliminates the need for a cut in
the policy rate.
While it is clear from this example that credit policy can be used for stabilization pur-
poses, one might still wonder whether it is needed: could not interest-rate policy already
accomplish as much, if we allow interest-rate policy to respond to the shock, rather than
assuming mechanical compliance with a simple Taylor rule? While modification of the as-
sumed interest-rate policy (for example, assuming a “spread-adjusted Taylor rule” of the
kind considered in Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2010, under which the intercept of the Taylor rule
is reduced in proportion to any increase in the credit spread) can indeed mitigate the effects
of the disturbance that are shown for the case γ = 0 in the figure, it would not reduce them
to the extent that the credit policy with γ = 1 is able to. The reason is that the disturbance
shifts up the schedule ω¯t(L); in the absence of central-bank lending, this means that either
the credit spread must increase (which will distort the composition of expenditure, regardless
of the absolute level of interest rates) or borrowing must decrease (which would also require
a reduction of the relative spending of borrowers), or both. Thus while a large enough cut in
51It is not quite true that there is no change in the various endogenous variables, because the shift from
private lending to central-bank lending slightly increases the resources consumed in financial intermediation.
However, under our parameterization, this resource use is small enough that the effects on both aggregate
output and private expenditure are similar to those that would occur in the absence of the disturbance.
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the policy rate can prevent output from declining, this policy will not eliminate the distortion
of the composition of expenditure.
The inadequacy of interest-rate policy alone is even more obvious in the case of a financial
disturbance large enough to cause the zero lower bound on the policy rate to bind. Figure 6
plots impulse responses to the same kind of disturbance as in Figure 5, but when the shock
is assumed to be three times as large.52 In this case, under the γ = 0 policy, the contraction
of output and reduction in inflation are sufficiently extreme that the zero lower bound on the
policy rate binds, assuming an interest-rate policy that is again determined by the Taylor
rule (4.2). The effects of the disturbance in the absence of credit policy are slightly more
than three times as great as those shown in Figure 5, owing to the binding zero lower bound.
But even more importantly, it is obvious in this case that it would not be possible to avoid
those effects simply by assuming an even more aggressive reduction in the policy rate than
that called for by the Taylor rule; for the zero lower bound would in any event prevent deeper
interest-rate cuts at the time of the shock. Yet once again, a sufficiently aggressive credit
policy can almost completely insulate aggregate output, both types of private expenditure,
and inflation from any effects of the disturbance.
4.3 Credit Policy and Welfare
We have seen from Figures 5 and 6 that credit policy can be used to stabilize the economy,
most notably in response to purely financial disturbances that shift the ω¯t(L) schedule. But is
it desirable to do so, and to what extent? Our model can also be used to consider the optimal
use of this additional dimension of policy, if we are willing to suppose that the prudential
arguments against the central bank’s involvement in the allocation of credit should not be
determinative, at least in the case of sufficiently severe financial disruptions. In our model, an
increase in Lcbt can improve welfare on two grounds: for a given volume of private borrowing
bt, an increase in L
cb
t allows the volume of private lending Lt to fall, which should reduce
both the resources Ξpt consumed by the intermediary sector and the equilibrium credit spread
ωt (due to equilibrium relation (2.9)). Under plausible conditions, our model implies both
52That is, ω¯0(L¯) is increased by 12 percentage points per annum.
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a positive shadow value ϕΞ,t of reductions in Ξt (the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the resource constraint (2.2)) and a positive shadow value ϕω,t of reductions in ωt; hence an
increase in Lcbt should be desirable on both grounds.
In the absence of any assumed cost of central-bank credit policy, one can easily obtain
the result that it is always optimal for the central bank to lend in amount sufficient to
allow an equilibrium with Lt = 0, i.e., the central bank should substitute for private credit
markets altogether. Of course, we do not regard this as a realistic conclusion. As a simple
way of introducing into our calculations the fact that the central bank is unlikely to have a
comparative advantage at the activity of credit allocation under normal circumstances, we
assume that central-bank lending consumes real resources in a quantity Ξcb(Lcbt ), by analogy
with our assumption that real resources Ξpt are consumed by private intermediaries. The
function Ξcb(L) is assumed to be increasing and at least weakly convex; in particular, we
assume that Ξcb′(0) > 0, so that there is a positive marginal resource cost of this activity, even
when the central bank starts from a balance sheet made up entirely of Treasury securities.
The first-order conditions for optimal choice of Lcbt then become:
ϕΞ,t[Ξ¯
p′
t (bt − Lcbt )− Ξcb′(Lcbt )] + ϕω,t[Ξ¯p′′t (bt − Lcbt ) + χ′′t (bt − Lcbt )] ≤ 0, (4.4)
Lcbt ≥ 0, (4.5)
together with the complementary slackness condition that at least one of conditions (4.4) or
(4.5) must hold with equality in each period. (Here the first expression in square brackets
in (4.4) is the partial derivative of Ξt with respect to L
cb
t , holding constant the value of total
borrowing bt, while the second expression in square brackets is the partial derivative of ωt
with respect to Lcbt under the same assumption.)
A “Treasuries only” policy is optimal in the event of a corner solution, in which (4.4) is an
inequality, as will be the case if Ξcb′(0) is large enough. In our view, it is most reasonable to
calibrate the model so that this is true in steady state. Then not only will the optimal policy
involve “Treasuries only” in the steady state, but (assuming that the inequality is strict at
the steady state) this will continue to be true in the case of any stochastic disturbances that
are small enough. However, it will remain possible for the optimal policy to require Lcbt > 0
in the case of certain large enough disturbances. This is especially likely to be true in the
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case of large enough disruptions of the financial sector, of a type that increase the marginal
resource cost of private intermediation (the value of Ξ¯p′) and/or the degree to which increases
in private credit require a larger credit spread (the value of ω¯′).
However, not all “purely financial” disturbances — by which we mean exogenous shifts
in the functions Ξ¯pt (L) or χt(L) of a type that increase the equilibrium credit spread ω¯t(L)
for a given volume of private credit — are equally likely to justify an active central-bank
credit policy on the grounds just mentioned. In fact, the optimal credit policy response to a
given shift in the function ω¯t(L) depends greatly on the source of the shift.
53 To illustrate
this, we consider the quantitative effects of alternative types of purely financial disturbances
in our calibrated model.
4.4 The Value of Relaxing the “Treasuries Only” Restriction
We first assume that a strict policy of “Treasuries only” is maintained, but seek to determine
the shadow value of relaxing this constraint, i.e., the marginal increase in the value of the
welfare objective (2.16) that is achieved by a marginal increase in Lcbt above zero in some
period. This shadow value is given by the left-hand side of (4.4); a positive value would imply
that welfare is increased by allowing Lcbt to be positive.
54 Since the shadow value is obviously
reduced if we assume a higher marginal cost Ξcb′(0) of central-bank lending — and since
nothing about the equilibrium associated with the “Treasuries only” constraint is affected
by the assumed value of Ξcb′(0), other than this shadow value — an alternative measure of
53Our result here is quite different from that in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009a), where the consequence of
a “purely financial” disturbance for optimal interest-rate policy, taking as given the path of central-bank
lending to the private sector, depends (to a first approximation) only on the size of the shift in ω¯t(L¯), which
is why the paper does not bother to show the optimal responses to more than one type of purely financial
disturbance. The same is true of the calculations in the previous section that illustrate the ability of credit
policy to stabilize the economy in response to a purely financial disturbance: we show our results for only
one type of disturbance because the figures are fairly similar when we consider alternative disturbances that
shift the function ω¯t(L) to the same extent.
54Note that condition (4.4) requires the shadow value to be non-positive under an optimal policy, as there
is assumed to be no practical obstacle (apart from those reflected in the central bank’s resource cost function
Ξcb(L)) to a positive level of central-bank lending.
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the value of relaxing the constraint, that is economically meaningful, is to report the value
of Ξcb′(0) that is required in order for the shadow value of relaxation of the constraint to
be exactly zero. (The higher the shadow value of relaxing the constraint, in the case of any
fixed value of Ξcb′(0), the higher the value of Ξcb′(0) that would be required to reduce the
shadow value to zero; and indeed one of these quantities is a linear function of the other.)
Thus the quantity that we report in our figures is the value of
Ξcb′,critt ≡ Ξ¯p′t (Lt) +
ϕω,t
ϕΞ,t
[Ξ¯p′′t (Lt) + χ
′′
t (Lt)] (4.6)
in an equilibrium where the “Treasuries only” policy is imposed. Note that this quantity
exceeds the marginal resource cost of lending by private intermediaries (Ξ¯p′) to the extent
that either Ξ¯pt (L) or χt(L) is a strictly convex function. Under the calibration used here,
Ξ¯p′ is equal to 2.0 percent per annum in the steady state, while the steady-state value of
Ξcb′,crit, the minimum marginal cost of central-bank lending required for “Treasuries only”
to be optimal, is nearly 3.5 percent per annum, as shown in Figure 7. The assumed degree
of convexity of the function Ξ¯p(L) makes a substantial difference.
Under the calibration assumed, “Treasuries only” will be optimal in the steady state, if
we make the further assumption that Ξcb′(0) is equal to 3.5 percent per annum or more. But
what if a financial disturbance causes a significant increase in the size of credit spreads? The
answer depends on the nature of the financial disturbance, and not only on the size of the
increase in credit spreads.
To illustrate this point, let us consider four different possible purely financial disturbances,
each of which will be assumed to increase the value of ω¯t(L¯) by the same number of percentage
points. By an additive shock, we mean one that translates the schedule ω¯t(L) vertically by
a constant amount; a multiplicative shock will instead multiply the entire schedule ω¯t(L) by
some constant factor greater than 1. We shall also distinguish between disturbances that
change the function Ξ¯t(L) (“Ξ shocks”) and disturbances that change the function χt(L) (“χ
shocks”). Thus a “multiplicative χ shock” is a change in the function χt(L) as a consequence
of which the schedule ω¯t(L) is multiplied by a factor greater than 1 for all values of L, and
so on.
Figure 7 plots the dynamic response of Ξcb′,critt to each of these four types of purely
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financial disturbance, when the model is calibrated as discussed above. (The quantity defined
in (4.6) is multiplied by 400 so that the interest-rate differential is expressed in percentage
points per annum.) In these simulations, both interest-rate policy and reserve-supply policy
are assumed to be optimal, and each of the four disturbances is of a size that increases the
value of ωt(L¯) by 4 percentage points per annum (i.e., from 2.0 percent to 6.0 percent),
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in Figure 5.56 Moreover, the effect of the disturbance is assumed to decay exponentially, so
that
ω¯t(L¯) = ω¯ + [ω¯0(L¯)− ω¯] ρt
for all t ≥ 0 for each of the four shocks, and again we assume that ρ = 0.9.
The figure clearly shows that the degree to which a financial disturbance provides a
justification for active central-bank credit policy depends very much on the reason for the
increase in spreads. In fact, the factors that affect the size of Ξcb′,critt are not too closely similar
to those that affect the size of ω¯t(L¯). The increase in ω¯t(L¯) is the sum of the increases in
Ξ¯p′(L¯) and χ′(L¯). The value of Ξcb′,critt is also increased by an increase in Ξ¯
p′, but not by
an increase in χ′ as such. Moreover, Ξcb′,critt is increased by increases in Ξ¯
p′′ and χ′′, or in
the relative shadow price ϕω,t/ϕΞ,t (which is generally increased by a financial disturbance,
since an increase in credit spreads increases the marginal distortion associated with a given
further increase in spreads), whereas these do not change the value of ωt(L¯).
The figure shows that Ξcb′,critt increases the most if the credit spread increases due to a
“multiplicative Ξ” shock, since in this case the increase in the spread is due entirely to an
increase in Ξ¯p′ and Ξ¯p′′ (and hence ω¯′) increases in the same proportion as does Ξ¯p′. Only
one of these two effects (the increase in Ξ¯p′ or the increase in ω¯′) is present in the case of the
“additive Ξ” or “multiplicative χ” shocks, and neither is present in the case of an “additive
χ” shock. In this last case (an increase in the fraction of loans that are expected not to
be repaid, that is independent of the volume of private lending), neither Ξ¯p′(L¯) nor ω¯′(L¯)
55This is not quite the same thing as defining the shocks so that they all increase equilibrium credit spreads
to the same amount, under the assumption of no central-bank lending. Because Lt declines from the value
L¯ in response to the shocks, ωt = ω¯t(Lt) does not increase as much as ω¯t(L¯). We prefer to measure the size
of the shock in terms that do not depend on a calculation of the endogenous response to the shock; but each
of these shocks does increase the equilibrium credit spread, and to a roughly similar extent.
56The disturbance considered in Figure 5 corresponds to the “additive χ” disturbance of this figure.
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increases due to the shock, while both Ξ¯p′(Lt) and ω¯′(Lt) decrease, owing to the decrease in
Lt (as a consequence of the increase in credit spreads).
57 Hence in the case of an “additive
χ” shock, the marginal social value of central-bank lending actually decreases at the time of
the shock.
Clearly, the mere fact that a given disturbance is observed to increase credit spreads
does not in itself prove that it would increase welfare for the central bank to lend directly
to private borrowers. This is not because conventional monetary policy (i.e., interest-rate
policy) alone suffices to eliminate the distortions created by such a disturbance (in our model,
it cannot, even if it can mitigate the distortions created by the disturbance to some extent);
nor is it because central-bank credit policy is unable to influence market credit spreads (in
our model, active credit policy would reduce the size of the credit spread). But even granting
both of these points, if central-bank lending is not costless (and we believe that it should
not be considered to be), then it is necessary to balance the costs of intervention against
the benefits expected to be achieved; and our model implies that there is no simple relation
between the outcome of this tradeoff and the degree to which credit spreads increase in
response to a shock.
Financial disturbances increase the marginal social benefit of central-bank credit policy
to a greater extent, however (relative to the size of the disturbance), if the zero lower bound
on the policy rate prevents the policy rate from being cut in response to the shock as much
as is assumed in Figure 7. The distortions created by a binding zero lower bound are
even greater under the hypothesis that policy is conducted in a forward-looking way after
the period in which the zero lower bound constrains the policy rate, so that there is no
commitment to subsequent reflation of a kind that would mitigate the extent to which the
zero bound results in an undesirably high level of the real policy rate. (An optimal interest-
rate policy commitment, that takes account of the occasionally binding zero lower bound, will
include a commitment to history-dependent policy of this sort, as discussed in Eggertsson
and Woodford, 2003, and Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2009b. However, such policy requires a
57This last effect, which by itself reduces the marginal social value of central-bank lending, is present in
the case of all four disturbances, but in the other three cases this effect is outweighed by the effects discussed
in the text that increase the value of Ξcb′,critt .
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type of commitment that actual central bankers seem quite reluctant to contemplate, as
discussed for example by Walsh, 2009.) If a binding zero lower bound coincides with this
kind of expectations about future monetary policy, the marginal social benefit of credit policy
may be much greater than would be suggested by Figure 7.
This is illustrated by Figure 8, where the same four types of financial disturbances are
considered, but the disturbances are assumed to be of the same size as in Figure 6. In the
figure, the responses of Ξcb′,critt are shown under two different assumptions about interest-rate
policy: in the top panels, interest-rate policy is assumed to be optimal, while in the bottom
row it is assumed to follow a Taylor rule of the form (4.2), again calibrated as before. The
figure also illustrates the consequences of the zero lower bound on interest rates; the panels
in the left column show the response of Ξcb′,critt under the assumption that the zero lower
bound can be ignored (even though this means that the policy rate is negative in the quarters
immediately following the shock, under either assumption about monetary policy), whereas
the corresponding panels in the right column show the response when the zero lower bound
is imposed as a constraint on monetary policy.
In the upper left panel of Figure 8, interest-rate policy is optimal and the zero lower
bound is assumed not to bind, as in Figure 7; hence the responses to all four disturbances
are exactly the same as in Figure 7, except that the scale of the departures from the steady
state is multiplied by a factor of three. In the lower left panel, we can see the difference that
is made by assuming instead that interest-rate policy follows the Taylor rule (4.2).58 The
increase in Ξcb′,critt is at least somewhat greater in the case of each of the types of financial
disturbances; even in the case of the “additive χ” shock, Ξcb′,critt declines by less than it does
under optimal interest-rate policy. Thus optimal interest-rate policy reduces at least slightly
the welfare gain from active credit policy.
In both panels of the left column of Figure 8, however, the policy rate is assumed to
become negative in response to the disturbances. The right column shows how the responses
58Exactly the same difference would be made in the case of disturbances of the size assumed in Figure 7, if
we assumed that policy followed the Taylor rule. Note that in the case of the smaller disturbances assumed
in Figure 7, there would be no difference between the two columns, as the zero lower bound would not be a
binding constraint even when imposed.
50
are modified when the zero lower bound is respected in our calculations. Because the zero
lower bound binds in the quarters immediately following financial disturbances of the mag-
nitude assumed in this figure,59 the marginal social benefit of central-bank credit policy is
greater than it would be if it were possible for the central bank to lower the policy rate
below zero, as assumed in the panels in the left column. Even in the case of an “additive χ”
shock, it can be optimal for the central bank to lend to the private sector when such a shock
occurs, even though it was not optimal in the absence of the shock. (In the case shown in
the figure, this would be true in the case of a value for Ξcb′(0) between 3.5 and 4.0 percent
per annum, for example.) The desirability of active credit policy is even greater if the zero
lower bound binds and interest-rate policy is determined as in (4.2). In this case, there is a
large increase in Ξcb′,critt as a result of a financial disturbance; and interestingly, in this case,
the size of the increase is similar regardless of the source of the increase in credit spreads.
Under each of the four types of financial disturbance that are considered, it will be optimal
for the central bank to lend to private borrowers, at least in the first two quarters, even if
the marginal cost of central-bank lending is as high as 10 percentage points per annum.
Thus there is a clearer case for active central-bank credit policy in the case of a financial
disturbance that is severe enough to cause the zero lower bound on the policy rate to become a
binding constraint; and in this case, it is to a first approximation only the size and persistence
of the effects of the disturbance on credit spreads that matters for determining the extent to
which credit policy is desirable. But supposing that the value of Ξcb′,critt rises above the value
of Ξcb′(0) in response to such a disturbance, how much is it optimal for the central bank to
lend, and for how long? We turn next to the characterization of optimal credit policy.
59In the case of optimal interest-rate policy, the lower bound binds in the first three quarters in the case
of the Ξ shocks, and in the first four quarters in the case of the χ shocks. In the case of the Taylor rule, the
lower bound binds in the first two quarters under all four shocks. The policy rate remains at the lower bound
for a longer time under an optimal policy commitment, for the same reason as in the numerical example of
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
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5 Optimal Credit Policy
We now consider the optimal state-contingent evolution of central-bank lending {Lcbt }, im-
posing only the constraint that it be non-negative, and taking account of the resource costs
of loan origination and monitoring by the central bank. We continue to assume the existence
of a competitive loan market, so that the central bank lends at the same (market-clearing)
interest rate ibt as the private intermediaries, who continue to lend even when the central
bank lends as well. (Our assumption of a highly convex cost function for private interme-
diaries ensures that they continue to serve part of the market, even if credit policy lowers
the equilibrium credit spread by several percentage points.) For simplicity, we assume in
this section that the resource costs of central-bank lending are of the form Ξcb(Lcb) = Ξ˜cbLcb
(i.e., that the marginal cost of central-bank lending is independent of the scale of its inter-
vention), but that Ξ˜cb is at least as large as Ξ¯cb′,crit, the steady-state value of Ξcb′,critt , so that
“Treasuries only” is an optimal policy in the steady state.
5.1 A Simple Case
There are clearly (theoretically possible) circumstances under which it is not only optimal
for the central bank to lend directly to the private sector, but under which it is optimal to do
this to the extent (or nearly the extent) necessary in order to prevent any increase in credit
spreads, or any reduction in private borrowing, in response to a financial disturbance. Here
we describe a simple case in which a strong result of that kind can be obtained. Suppose
that the only disturbance, relative to the deterministic steady state, is a “multiplicative Ξ”
shock that increases the costs of private intermediation. That is, we continue to assume that
χt(L) = 0, while Ξ¯
p
t (L) is a function of the form (4.1), with {Ξ˜pt} an exogenous process. In
the case that we wish to examine, we assume that there are no other disturbances, and that
Ξ˜pt is always greater than or equal to its steady-state value.






We can then write







and substituting this into (4.4), the first-order condition for optimal credit policy can be
written in the form





t ≤ 0, (5.2)
where now ωt is the only endogenous variable apart from the Lagrange multipliers. This is
a condition of the form
ωt ≤ ωˆ(ϕω,t/ϕΞ,t; Ξ˜pt ), (5.3)
and either this condition or (4.5) must hold with equality in any period.
Hence optimal credit policy prevents the credit spread from rising above the ceiling
ωˆ(ϕω,t/ϕΞ,t); it is optimal for the central bank to hold only liquid assets only in the case that
ωt does not exceed ωˆt under that policy. We have assumed that this condition is satisfied in
the steady state, but it can fail to hold when Ξ˜t increases, both because the shock increases
ωt (in the absence of active credit policy, as illustrated in Figures 9 and 10) and because it
decreases ωˆt. A shock of this type decreases ωˆt both because of the direct effect of Ξ˜
p
t on
the left-hand side of (5.2) and because it increases ϕω,t/ϕΞ,t, owing to increased urgency of
lowering credit spreads when they are unusually high.
A special case in which we obtain a particularly simple result is that in which we assume
that Ξ˜cb = Ξ¯cb′,crit exactly. In this case, “Treasuries only” remains optimal in the steady
state, but even an infinitesimal disturbance (of the right sign) can make it optimal to move
away from the corner solution. In this case (5.3) holds with equality in the steady state, and
if we assume a disturbance under which Ξ˜pt is always greater than or equal to its steady-
state value, as proposed above, (5.3) will hold with equality at all times in the perturbed
equilibrium as well. In this case, we can replace the pair of conditions (4.4)–(4.5) and the
complementary slackness condition by the simple requirement that





























Substituting this for Ξt in (2.2), we then obtain a complete system of equilibrium conditions
to determine the endogenous variables {Πt, Yt, λbt , λst , Zt, bt,∆t, idt , ibt , ωt} and the Lagrange
multipliers, given some specification of interest-rate policy (such as (4.2)), without any ref-
erence to the balance-sheet quantities of either private intermediaries or of the central bank.
(Of course, once we have solved for the optimal paths of {bt, ωt}, we can then solve (2.11)
and (5.1) for the required paths of {Lt, Lcbt } as well.)
In the case of a relatively convex of intermediation technology (so that capacity con-
straints are significant in the private intermediary sector), optimal credit policy (in the
special case just described) will allow relatively little variation in credit spreads in response
to financial disturbances. In fact, we show in the Appendix that in the limit as η is made







while (5.5) reduces to the limiting form Ξpt = 0. Note that neither expression depends on
Ξ˜pt in the limiting case. Hence in the limit, we have a system of equations to solve for the
paths of {ωt} and the Lagrange multipliers, along with the other endogenous variables listed
in the previous paragraph, which are unaffected by any disturbance to the path of {Ξ˜pt}. In
this limiting case, optimal credit policy ensures that ωt = ω¯ each period; the central bank
should lend to the private sector to the extent necessary to prevent any disturbance to the
size of the credit spread.
In fact, this is a good approximation in the case of the degree of convexity assumed in
the calibration proposed above. Figure 9 shows the impulse responses to a “multiplicative
Ξ” shock of the magnitude considered in Figure 7, under the assumption that monetary
policy follows the Taylor rule (4.2), when the model is calibrated as discussed above and
60Here we fix the steady-state credit spread ω¯, and vary the steady-state value of Ξ˜p as we vary η, so that
the intermediation technology remains consistent with this steady state. We also vary the value of Ξ˜cb as
we vary η, so that it continues to be true that Ξ˜cb = Ξ¯cb′,crit exactly. The other model parameters are held
fixed as we increase η.
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Ξ˜cb = Ξ¯cb′,crit exactly. The dashed lines show the impulse responses of several endogenous
variables in the case that the “Treasuries only” policy is adhered to. The shock increases the
equilibrium credit spread by more than 2.5 percentage points,61, and as a consequence, pri-
vate borrowing (and likewise private credit) contracts by more than 2 percent. This results
not only in a contraction of aggregate output and in deflation, but also in increased ineffi-
ciency of the composition of private expenditure: spending by type b households contracts
by more than 6 percent, while spending by type s households actually increases (owing to
the low returns available on their savings).
Under an optimal credit policy (shown by the solid lines), however, the responses are quite
different. Central-bank lending to the private sector should increase, to such an extent that
there is barely any increase in credit spreads, and barely any decline in private borrowing.
This requires considerable lending by the central bank, since private lending (not shown,
but equal to bt−Lcbt ) contracts even more (nearly twice as much) as in the absence of credit
policy; the reason is that private intermediaries contract credit supply even more when
they are unable to increase the interest rate at which they lend. The policy also results
in practically no contraction of output, practically no decrease in inflation, practically no
change in the composition of private spending, and stabilizes the economy without any need
for a cut in the policy rate.
If we assume instead that interest-rate policy is optimal (as in Figure 10, where the
disturbance is the same as in Figure 9), the effects of the shock on aggregate output and
inflation are much smaller even in the absence of credit policy, and the effects on the relative
expenditure by the two types are also somewhat smaller than those shown in Figure 9.
Nonetheless, interest-rate policy alone cannot prevent an increase in credit spreads and a
contraction of credit supply similar to those in Figure 9 (even though the zero lower bound
does not bind for a shock of this size), and there remains a role for credit policy. In fact,
the optimal degree of lending by the central bank in response to the shock is essentially the
same as in Figure 9, and again this is the amount needed to virtually eliminate any increase
in the credit spread or any reduction in private borrowing. The equilibrium under optimal
61Note that the spread does not increase by the full 4 percent by which ω¯t(L¯) increases, because of the
contraction of Lt.
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credit policy is virtually the same as in Figure 9: for while the Taylor rule is not too close
an approximation to optimal policy in the absence of credit policy, there is little need for a
more sophisticated interest-rate policy if credit policy is used optimally.
5.2 Alternative Cases of Financial Disturbances
The case in which Ξ˜cb is assumed to be no higher than Ξ¯cb′,crit is the one most favorable to
an argument for active credit policy, of course. Figure 11 shows the responses under active
credit policy (and in the absence of credit policy) for the same disturbance as in Figure 10,
and again under the assumption of optimal interest-rate policy, but in the case that Ξ˜cb is
assumed to be 10 basis points higher than Ξ¯cb′,crit.62 It remains optimal for the central bank
to begin lending to private borrowers when a disturbance of this kind occurs, as one would
expect from Figure 7. (Recall that Figure 5 showed Ξcb′,critt rising by much more than 10
basis points in response to a multiplicative Ξ shock.)
However, while the optimal increase in central-bank lending at the time of the shock is
not greatly less than in Figure 10, the optimal duration of active credit policy is much less
in this case (though the disturbance itself has the same persistence in both cases). In Figure
10, optimal credit policy requires the central bank’s lending not to have been completely
phased out six years and more after the shock; in Figure 11, central-bank lending should
already have been sharply contracted in the second year, and credit policy is phased out
altogether after a little more than two years. And while the effects of the disturbance on
credit spreads, private borrowing, aggregate output, and the composition of expenditure are
all mitigated by optimal credit policy, even relative to what can be achieved by optimal
interest-rate policy (again, in a case where interest-rate policy is not constrained by the zero
lower bound), the effects are not completely eliminated. If one assumes an event higher value
of Ξ¯cb′,crit, the optimal use of credit policy is further weakened.
The case considered above is also especially favorable to the optimality of active credit
policy because the type of financial disturbance considered is a “multiplicative Ξ” shock,
which as shown in Figures 7 and 8 is the type that increases the marginal social benefit of
62Under our calibration, Ξ¯cb′,crit is equal to 3.48 percent per annum, as shown in Figures 5 and 6, so this
means that Ξ˜cb = 3.58 percent.
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credit policy to the greatest extent, for a given size of increase in ω¯t(L¯). If we were to consider
instead an “additive χ” shock, again of the size assumed in Figure 7 — and if, as in Figure
11, we assume optimal interest-rate policy and a value of Ξ˜cb 10 basis points higher than
Ξ¯cb′,crit — then optimal credit policy will instead involve Lcbt = 0 in all periods. This can be
seen from Figure 7: a disturbance of this kind never raises the value of Ξcb′,critt by as much
as 10 basis points above the steady-state level.63 Yet this alternative disturbance increases
the equilibrium credit spread (under “Treasuries only”) by virtually the same amount as the
disturbance considered in Figure 11; and in fact, the size of the contraction in credit, the
size of the change in the composition of expenditure, and so on, are essentially the same in
this case as in the one shown in Figure 11. Hence it matters a great deal what causes an
increase in credit spreads, in order to judge the appropriate response of credit policy; and
the aspects of the disturbance that matter cannot easily be judged from an observation of
the aggregate effects of the disturbance alone.
As still another example (yielding a somewhat intermediate conclusion), Figure 12 dis-
plays the optimal policy response in the case of a “multiplicative χ” shock, also of the size
assumed in Figure 7. Under this hypothesis, credit spreads increase owing to a change in
the perceived risk of default by borrowers, but the fraction of loans expected to be bad
increases with the scale of lending, at such a rate as to leave unchanged the elasticity of the
credit-supply curve. It is assumed in this figure, as in Figure 11, that interest-rate policy
is optimal and that Ξ˜cb is 10 basis points higher than Ξ¯cb′,crit. As Figure 7 indicates, this
type of disturbance, like the “multiplicative Ξ” shock, increases the marginal social value
of central-bank lending enough to justify active credit policy. However, in this case, the
optimal amount of central-bank lending is both substantially smaller than in Figure 11, and
much more transitory: the optimal policy only involves lending to private borrowers in the
63The fact that we do assume a value of Ξ˜cb slightly above Ξ¯cb′,crit is, however, important for this result. If
we assume that Ξ˜cb = Ξ¯cb′,crit exactly, as in Figure 10, then in the case of an “additive χ” shock, it would not
be optimal for the central bank to lend at the time that the shock occurs, but it would be optimal for it to
commit to lend later. The optimal commitment of this kind would actually involve substantial central-bank
lending, lasting for many years — something that is not obvious from the path of Ξcb′,critt shown in Figure
7. But because this conclusion is radically changed by even a small increase in the assumed cost of lending
by the central bank, we do not further discuss this fine point in the theory of optimal credit policy here.
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first two quarters. While the credit policy does mitigate the effects of the disturbance to
some extent (not too visible in the figure), the economy’s response to the disturbance is not
dramatically different than it would be in the absence of credit policy: the credit spread
still increases by 2 percentage points, and so on. The size, persistence and effects of optimal
credit policy are similarly modest in the case of an “additive Ξ” shock.
As Figure 8 has already shown, the case for active credit policy is somewhat stronger —
and more robust to alternative assumptions about the nature of the financial disturbance —
in the case of disturbances large enough to cause the zero lower bound to constrain interest-
rate policy, and especially if interest-rate policy is purely forward-looking (as in the case of
a Taylor rule). For example, Figure 13 displays the optimal policy response in the case of a
“multiplicative Ξ” shock that is now three times as large as the one considered in Figure 11
(which is to say, of the size assumed in Figure 8). As in Figure 11, Ξ˜cb is assumed to be 10
basis points higher than Ξ¯cb′,crit; but interest-rate policy is now assumed to follow the Taylor
rule (4.2). As the figure indicates, the zero lower bound on the policy rate does bind in the
case of a shock of this size. Because Ξ˜cb is higher than Ξ¯cb′,crit, optimal credit policy does not
insulate the economy from the effects of the financial disturbance to the extent that was true
in Figure 9. But it does prevent the credit spread from rising nearly as much as it would in
the absence of credit policy, and averts a large part of the decline in private borrowing as
well; this eliminates the declines in output and inflation almost entirely, and greatly reduces
the distortion of the composition of private spending.
Figures 14 and 15 show the corresponding optimal responses in the case of “multiplicative
χ” and “additive χ” shocks respectively, again of the size assumed in Figure 8. While the
optimal scale and duration of lending by the central bank is considerably smaller in these two
cases than in the case of the “multiplicative Ξ” shock shown in Figure 13, it is still optimal
in these cases for the central bank to intervene in a substantial way for several quarters. And
credit policy has important effects in each of these cases, significantly reducing the size of the
spike in credit spreads at the time of the shock, and considerably weakening the contraction
of spending by type b households. Our conclusions about optimal credit policy are also more
robust in this case, not only in the sense that the optimal responses to the two different
types of χ shocks are now more similar, but (more importantly) in that our results are no
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longer especially sensitive to the precise of Ξ˜cb, even in the case of the “additive χ” shock.
At the same time, the optimal responses to the χ shocks shown in these last two figures
are quite different from the optimal response to a “multiplicative Ξ” shock. Thus even when
the zero lower bound binds and interest-rate policy can be described by a Taylor rule, the
size of the increase in credit spreads alone provides insufficient information to judge the
optimal credit policy response with much precision.
5.3 Segmented Credit Markets
In the simple model expounded above, there is a single credit market and single borrowing
rate ibt charged for loans in this market; our discussion of central-bank credit policy has
correspondingly simply referred to the optimal quantity of central-bank lending to the private
sector overall, as if the allocation of this credit is not an issue. In reality, of course, there are
many distinct credit markets, and many different parties to which the central bank might
consider lending. Moreover, since there is only a potential case to be made for central-bank
credit policy when private financial markets are severely impaired, it does not make sense
to assume efficient allocation of credit among different classes of borrowers by the private
sector, so that only the total credit extended by the central bank would matter. Our simple
discussion here has sought merely to clarify the connection that exists, in principle, between
decisions about credit policy and the other dimensions of credit policy. An analysis of credit
policy that could actually be used as a basis for credit policy decisions would instead have
to allow for multiple credit markets, with imperfect arbitrage between them.
We do not here attempt an extension of our model in that direction. (A simple extension
would be to allow for multiple types of “type b” households, each only able to borrow
in a particular market with its own borrowing rate, and market-specific frictions for the
intermediaries lending in each of these markets.) We shall simply note that in such an
extension, there would be a distinct first-order condition, analogous to conditions (4.4)–
(4.5), for each of the segmented credit markets. There would be no reason to assume that
the question whether active credit policy is justified should have a single answer at a given
point in time: lending might be justified in one or two specific markets while the corner
solution remained optimal in the other markets.
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Thus the main determinants of whether central-bank credit policy is justified — when
it is justifiable to initiate active policy, and when it would be correct to phase out such
programs — should not be questions such as whether the zero lower bound on interest-rate
policy binds, or whether the central bank continues to undershoot the level of real GDP that
it would like to attain. While aggregate conditions will be one factor that affects the shadow
value of marginal reductions in the size of credit spreads (represented by the multiplier ϕω,t
in (4.4)), the value of this multiplier will likely be different for different markets, and the
main determinants of variations in it are likely to be market-specific. This will be even more
true of the other variables that enter into the first-order condition (4.4).
6 Conclusions
We have shown that a canonical New Keynesian model of the monetary transmission mech-
anism can be extended in a fairly simple way to allow analysis of additional dimensions of
central bank policy that have been at center stage during the recent global financial crisis:
variations in the size and composition of the central-bank balance sheet, and in the interest
rate paid on reserves, alongside the traditional monetary policy issue of the choice of an
operating target for the federal funds rate (or some similar overnight inter-bank rate else-
where). But we have found that explicitly modeling the role of the central-bank balance
sheet in equilibrium determination need not imply any role for “quantitative easing” as an
additional tool of stabilization policy, even when the zero lower bound on the policy rate
is reached. While different results might be obtained under alternative theoretical assump-
tions, our reading of the Bank of Japan’s experience with quantitative easing leads us to
suspect that our theoretical irrelevance result is likely close to the truth.
Our analysis indicates that there may, instead, be a role for central-bank credit policy
(or for targeted asset purchases), when private financial markets are sufficiently impaired.
It is worth stressing that the central bank’s asset holdings should also be irrelevant for
macroeconomic equilibrium in the case of well-functioning financial markets that can be
accessed at low cost by any economic agents who would benefit from such trades. Hence
credit policy is only a relevant additional dimension of central-bank policy to the extent that
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private markets are not already effectively eliminating most of the potential gains from trade
in financial instruments; and while we recognize that there are circumstances, such as those
arising during the recent crisis, in which it is arguable that financial markets fail to fulfill
that function, we are inclined to suspect that it is only at times of unusual financial distress
that active credit policy will have substantial benefits.
We therefore do not propose that central-bank trading in multiple financial markets
should be a routine feature of the conduct of monetary policy going forward, at least in
countries with well-developed financial markets like the U.S. Under normal circumstances,
the only policy decision that the central bank should need to make is the adjustment of
its operating target for a short-term nominal interest rate, and “Treasuries only” will be
an appropriate policy with regard to the composition of its balance sheet. It is nonetheless
important to understand the principles under which credit policy may appropriately be used
during emergencies.
Even when financial markets are seriously disrupted, as indicated by significant increases
in interest-rate spreads, our case for active credit policy remains a cautious one. While
we have shown that it is possible for disturbances originating in the financial sector to
create circumstances under central-bank lending to the private sector can increase welfare,
our analysis has also shown that the mere size of the increase in credit spreads does not
provide sufficient information about the nature of the disturbance to judge the benefits of
active credit policy. Moreover, while we have shown that credit policy is more likely to
be justified when a financial disturbance is severe enough to make the zero lower bound
a binding constraint on interest-rate policy, the mere fact that the zero bound has been
reached is neither necessary nor sufficient for active credit policy to be welfare-improving. In
particular, the appropriateness of active credit policy is likely to depend on conditions that
are specific to the markets for particular financial instruments, and that therefore cannot be
assessed on the basis of macroeconomic conditions alone.
At the same time, when active credit policy is justified, it would be a mistake to refrain
from it because of fear that increasing the size of the central bank’s balance sheet poses some
inherent inflationary threat. Our analysis shows that decisions about interest-rate policy are
not constrained in any direct way by decisions about either the size or composition of the
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central bank’s balance sheet, as long as the central bank is willing to adjust the interest
rate paid on reserves appropriately. Payment of interest on reserves can make even a large
quantity of excess reserves consistent with high short-term interest rates, and hence with
monetary and financial conditions consistent with a central bank’s inflation target — and
this will be true even when the economy is no longer characterized by any large degree of
slack productive capacity.
Thus in considering an appropriate strategy for “exit” from the current unconventional
posture of the Federal Reserve, it is important to recognize that, according to our model,
there is no reason that the timing of the Fed’s reduction in its holdings of assets other than
short-term Treasuries must be be tied in some mechanical way to the timing of a decision to
raise the federal funds rate above its current historically low level. These are independent
dimensions of policy, not only in the sense that they can be varied independently in practice,
but in that they have different effects as well, and are appropriately adjusted on the basis
of considerations that are fairly different. Just as the primary justification for undertaking
non-traditional asset purchases should relate to conditions specific to the markets for those
assets, rather than to the central bank’s assessment about whether the level of the policy
rate is correct, so should decisions about the proper time at which to unwind such purchases.
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Figure 3: Spreads between yields on four different classes of commercial paper and the 1-
month OIS rate, together with the value of paper acquired by the Fed under its Commercial














































































Nominal GDP (left axis) Monetary Base (right axis)
Figure 4: The monetary base and nominal GDP for Japan (both seasonally adjusted), 1990-
2009. The shaded region shows the period of “quantitative easing,” from March 2001 through
March 2006. (Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics and Bank of Japan.)
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γ = 0 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.8 γ = 0.9 γ = 1
Figure 5: Responses to an increase in χ˜t that increases ωt(L¯) by 4 percentage points, in the
case of credit policies characterized by alternative values of γ. The response of idt is plotted
in terms of the absolute level, so that the distance from the zero bound can be observed; all
other variables are measured as deviations from their respective steady-state values.
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γ = 0 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.8 γ = 0.9 γ = 1
Figure 6: Responses to an increase in χ˜t that increases ωt(L¯) by 12 percentage points, in the
case of credit policies characterized by alternative values of γ.
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Figure 7: Response of the critical threshold value of Ξcb′(0) for a corner solution, in the case
of four different types of “purely financial” disturbances, each of which increases ωt(L¯) by 4
percentage points. Interest-rate policy responds optimally in each case.
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Accounting for the ZLB



























Figure 8: Response of the critical threshold value of Ξcb′(0) for a corner solution, in the case
of financial disturbances that increase ωt(L¯) by 12 percentage points. Interest-rate policy
responds optimally in the panels of the top row, but follows a Taylor rule in the bottom
panels. The zero lower bound is assumed not to constrain interest-rate policy in the panels
of the left column, while the constraint is imposed in the corresponding panels of the right
column.
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Optimal Credit Policy No Credit Policy
Figure 9: Impulse responses under optimal credit policy compared to those under a policy of
“Treasuries only,” in the case of a “multiplicative Ξ” shock of the size considered in Figure
7, if interest-rate policy follows a Taylor rule and Ξ˜cb is exactly equal to the steady-state
critical threshold.
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Optimal Credit Policy No Credit Policy
Figure 10: Impulse responses under optimal credit policy compared to those under a policy of
“Treasuries only,” with the same disturbance as in Figure 9, but under optimal interest-rate
policy. Again Ξ˜cb is exactly equal to the steady-state critical threshold.
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Optimal Credit Policy No Credit Policy
Figure 11: Impulse responses under optimal credit policy and under “Treasuries only,” for
the same disturbance and interest-rate policy as in Figure 10, but when Ξ˜cb is 10bp higher
than the steady-state critical threshold.
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Optimal Credit Policy No Credit Policy
Figure 12: Impulse responses under optimal credit policy and under “Treasuries only,” in
the case of a “multiplicative χ” shock of the size considered in Figure 7. As in Figure 11,
interest-rate policy is optimal and Ξ˜cb is 10bp higher than the steady-state critical threshold.
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Optimal Credit Policy No Credit Policy
Figure 13: Impulse responses under optimal credit policy and under “Treasuries only,” in
the case of a “multiplicative Ξ” shock of the size considered in Figure 8. Interest-rate policy
follows a Taylor rule and Ξ˜cb is 10bp higher than the steady-state critical threshold.
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Optimal Credit Policy No Credit Policy
Figure 14: Impulse responses in the case of a “multiplicative χ” shock of the size considered
in Figure 8, under the same assumptions as in Figure 13.
81























































Optimal Credit Policy No Credit Policy
Figure 15: Impulse responses in the case of an “additive χ” shock of the size considered in
Figure 8, under the same assumptions as in Figure 13.
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